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INTRODUCTION
Nearly thirty-five years ago in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief Justice Warren
Burger declared that state programs or policies could excessively-and, there-
fore, unconstitutionally-entangle government and religion, not only by requir-
ing or allowing intrusive public monitoring of religious institutions and activities,
but also through what he called their "divisive political potential."2 Government
actions burdened with such "potential," he reasoned, pose a "threat to the
normal political process" and "divert attention from the myriad issues and
problems that confront every level of government."3 Chief Justice Burger
asserted also, and more fundamentally, that "political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect. ' 4 And from this Hobbesian premise' about the intent
animating the First Amendment, he proceeded on the assumption that the
Constitution authorizes courts to protect our "normal political process" from a
particular kind of strife and to purge a particular kind of disagreement from
politics and public conversations about how best to achieve the common good.
This Article provides a close and critical examination of the argument that
observations or predictions of "political division along religious lines" should
shape or supply the enforceable content of the First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause. The examination is timely, not only because of the sharp polariza-
tion that is said to characterize contemporary politics, but also because of the
increasing prominence of this "political division" argument. Justice Breyer, for
example, in his crucial concurring opinion in one of the recent Ten Command-
ments cases, identified "avoid[ing] that divisiveness based upon religion that
promotes social conflict" as one of the "basic purposes of [the Religion]
Clauses."6 He then voted to reject the First Amendment challenge to the public
display at issue in part because, in his view, to sustain it "might well encourage
disputes" and "thereby create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness
that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.",7 Justice Stevens went even
further, referring to "Government's obligation to avoid divisiveness and exclu-
sion in the religious sphere."8 In another arena, a prominent young scholar has
offered both a diagnosis of and a cure for our "church-state problem"--namely,
that we are "Divided by God." 9 This problem, he warns, poses a "fundamental
2. 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
3. Id. at 622, 623.
4. Id. at 622.
5. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21 CARDozo L.
REV. 1243, 1249 (2000) (discussing and citing THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt. III, chs. 42, 43 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651)) ("The great end of government, for Hobbes, is to prevent civil
disorder.").
6. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 2871.
8. Id. at 2875 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
9. NOAH FELDMAN, DrvtDED By GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do
ABOUT IT (2005).
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challenge to the project of self-government."' In a similar vein, the religion-
related cover story of a recent issue of one of our leading newsmagazines
reported, "Divided, We Stand."'" It appears that the political-divisiveness argu-
ment is and will for some time remain at the heart of our discussions about
religious freedom and the First Amendment.
The inquiry and analysis that follow have empirical, doctrinal, and normative
components: What, exactly, is "religiously based social conflict"-or, as the
Court put it in Lemon, "political... divisiveness on religious lines"? 12 What,
exactly, is the relevance of such conflict to the wisdom, morality, or constitution-
ality of state action? How plausible, and how normatively attractive, are the
political-divisiveness argument and the "principle" it is thought to vindicate?' 3
How well do this argument and this principle cohere with the relevant text,
history, traditions, and values? And what does the recent resurfacing of this
argument in the Establishment Clause context reveal and portend about the state
and trajectory of First Amendment theory and doctrine more generally?
14
Working through these questions, I am mindful of John Courtney Murray's
warning that we should "cherish only modest expectations with regard to the
solution of the problem of religious pluralism and civic unity."' 5 Accordingly,
while I hope this Article will contribute to our conversations about the role of
religious expression, belief, believers, and institutions in public life, my more
specific goal is to identify and analyze---critically, carefully, and contextu-
ally-a specific and salient line of constitutional argument.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part One sets the stage with an overview of
the relevant social and political context and also of the political-divisiveness
argument's current revival. Part Two provides a comprehensive history of this
argument, tracing its development and cataloging its deployments, with particu-
lar emphasis on its use by Chief Justice Burger in Lemon. This review suggests,
among other things, that the "political division along religious lines" argument
10. Id. at 251. Feldman suggests, intriguingly, that "[perhaps... it might be said that God has
divided us, by virtue of the profound religious diversity that we have long had and that is daily
expanding. Since Madison, this diversity has often been called a blessing and a source of strength or
balance, yet it also remains, as it always has been, a fundamental challenge to the project of
self-government."
11. Jay Tolson, Divided, We Stand: America's Long Struggle to Balance Church and State Isn't
Getting Any Easier, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 8, 2005, at 42.
12. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
13. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 724 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
14. See Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The Neglected Center of the First
Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1233, 1239 n.19 (noting the "underlying unity among constitutional
commitments to free expression, free exercise, and non-establishment" and that "[t]hough often treated
as independent or even conflicting, these commitments have a common textual source and a common
early history, so it would be helpful to have an account that captures their common themes") (citing
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1944) ("[T]he great liberties insured by the First
Article... are interwoven .... [Tihey have unity in the charter's prime place because they have unity
in their human sources and functionings.")).
15. JOHN CouRTNEY MuRRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRuTHs: CATHoLIc REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERCAN
PRoPosmoN 38 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2005) (1960).
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("the Argument") has rarely been outcome-determinative or done much real
juridical work.16 Instead, it seems to have served primarily as a rhetorical
device or as a concluding flourish to the application of one or another doctrinal
"test." This account highlights, among other things, the Argument's amorphous-
ness--or, perhaps, its adaptability. Put differently, the analytical narrative pro-
vided in Part Two reveals that not only is it unclear precisely what work the
Argument does, it is also not obvious what the Argument is. Accordingly, in
Part Three, I unpack and reassemble the Argument, considering a number of
versions and casting it in a variety of ways. I conclude, though, that none of
these variations is convincing. That concerns about "political division along
religious lines" are real and reasonable does not mean that they can or should
supply the enforceable content of the First Amendment's prohibition on establish-
ments of religion.
At the end of the day, this Article offers a reminder that-again, in Murray's
words-"pluralism [is] the native condition of American society"' 7 and that the
unity toward which Americans have aspired-e pluribus unum-is a "unity of a
limited order."' 8 Those who crafted our Constitution believed that both authen-
tic freedom and effective government could and should be secured through
checks and balances, rather than standardization, and by harnessing, rather than
homogenizing, the messiness of democracy.' 9 It is both misguided and quixotic,
then, to employ the First Amendment to smooth out the bumps and divisions
that are an unavoidable part of the political life of a diverse and free people and,
perhaps, best regarded as an indication that society is functioning well. 20 It is,
16. However, Justice Breyer's recent concurring-and controlling-opinion in Van Orden might
suggest that this is changing. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
17. MuRRAY, supra note 15, at 43.
18. Id. at 59.
19. See, e.g., JOHN WrITrE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONsTITUTONAL EXPERIMENT 46-48 (2d ed.
2005) (discussing the role of "religious pluralism" in the thinking of the Founding generation);
McConnell, supra note 5, at 1254 ("The structure of American democracy was based on pluralism and
diversity-the balance of power among sects and factions-rather than on a contrived homogeneity."
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison))).
20. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEN, WHY Socir=s NEED DISSENT 213 (2003) (contending that "[w]ell-
functioning societies [should] take steps to discourage conformity and to promote dissent"); Christo-
pher Hitchens, Bring on the Mud, WILSON Q., Autumn 2004, at 44, 46 ("By definition, politics is, or
ought to be, division. It expresses, or at least reflects, or at the very least emulates, the inevitable
difference of worldview that originates, for modem purposes, with Edmund Burke and Thomas
Paine."); Jonathan Rauch, Bipolar Disorder, ATLANC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 110 ("Politically
speaking, our fifty-fifty America is a divisive, rancorous place. The rest of the world should be so
lucky."); Andrew Sullivan, Federal Express, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 2004, at 6 ("[C]ultural polariza-
tion is emphatically not a problem. It's a sign of political health, a bellwether of a society that has not
given up on debating first-principle issues of human morality."). Professor Smith put the matter well:
It is arguable... that pluralism... has been the usual condition of Western peoples and that
the normal and natural response to pluralism is not to shun contested foundational truths but to
strive with even greater care and energy to figure out what those truths are.
Steven D. Smith, The Pluralist Predicament: Contemporary Theorizing in the Law of Religious
Freedom, 10 LEGAL THEORY 51, 57 (2004).
[Vol. 94:16671670
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after all, not a failure, but-as Justice Brennan observed-a "function of free
speech under our system of government to invite dispute. It may indeed best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfac-
tion with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.",
2 1
I. SET'ING THE STAGE
The word "religion" comes from ligare, which means to tie or bind to-
gether.22 Today, however, many regard religion's purported tendency to "di-
vide"-its capacity to cause, in Chief Justice Burger's words,
"political... divisiveness on religious lines" 23-as its necessary, near-defining
feature. 24 Because religious commitments and religion's influence are viewed
by many as particularly and perniciously divisive, they are often framed as
pressing challenges for political communities, democratic theory, and constitu-
tional law. In the culture and in the academy, pluralism, difference, and diversity
are celebrated; dissent, nonconformity, boundary-testing, and competition are,
most of us agree, well and good; but the division-or worse, the "divisiveness"-
allegedly fomented by religious beliefs, claims, and expression is widely seen as
cause for alarm. z5 Justice Souter, for example, asserted recently in one of the
21. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949)).
22. 13 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICIONARY 568 (2d ed. 1989); JOHN AyTo, DICTIONARY OF WORD ORIGINS 438
(1991). The Middle French derivative is relier, "to connect, fasten together." A. REY, DiCrnONNAIRE
HISTORIQUE DE LA LANGuE FRANCAIASE 2017-18, 3161 (2000).
23. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,623 (1971).
24. See, e.g., FREDERICK MARK GEDicKs, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1995) (describing the "secular individualist" view in which religion
is regarded as "an irrational and regressive antisocial force that must be strictly confined to private life
in order to avoid social division, violence, and anarchy"); Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and
the Attack on Constitutional Secularism, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1005, 1011, 1013 (2004) ("Religion is by
its very nature exclusionary, which means that religion is incapable of producing .. unity ....
[P]olitical unity... is actually antithetical to religion's entire reason for existing." (emphasis added));
William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 854 (1993) (referring to the
"'dark side' of religion and religious belief--the side of religion that is inherently intolerant and
persecutory"); Stanley Fish, Why We Can't All Just Get Along, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1996, at 18 ("[A]
person of religious conviction should not want to enter the marketplace of ideas but to shut it
down .. "); see also Luke 12:51 (Douay-Rheims) ("Think ye, that I am come to give peace on earth? I
tell you, no; but separation."); cf., e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 504, 539 (2003) ("Religion is exclusionary. It doesn't have to be, but it often is."); John C.
Danforth, Leaders Can Find Unity in What Divides Us, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 2002, at B3
("The root meaning of the word suggests that religion is supposed to bind us together. If this is so, then
those 'religions' that are divisive should be called by another name. To call a belief that is designed to
be a wedge a religion is deceptive to the point of being fraudulent."). More recently, commenting on the
Court's two Ten Commandments cases, Danforth asserted that "efforts to haul references of God into
the public square, into schools and courthouses, are far more apt to divide Americans than to advance
faith." John C. Danforth, Onward, Moderate Christian Soldiers, N.Y. TtMEs, June 17, 2005, at A27,
quoted in Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2874 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
25. See Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, 78 CIn.-KENT L. REv. 717,
720-21 (2003) ("I have always found it strange that we might entertain a profound national commit-
ment to the proposition that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, but
2006] 1671
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Ten Commandments cases that "the divisiveness of religion in current life is
inescapable. 26 Indeed, according to Richard Dawkins, "[o]nly the wilfully
blind could fail to implicate the divisive force of religion in most, if not all, of
the violent enmities in the world today.
' 27
The argument that "political division along religious lines, 2s is constitution-
ally significant-as well as politically, culturally, or aesthetically troubling-
appears to be enjoying something of a comeback after a time on the doctrinal
back burner.29 A few years ago, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the First Amendment permits Ohio to
include religious schools in that state's school-choice program.3° Writing for a
narrow majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that Ohio had not unconsti-
tutionally established or endorsed religion by permitting the program's low-
income beneficiaries to direct their scholarship funds to otherwise-eligible
religious schools.31 Justice Breyer dissented, writing separately "to emphasize
the risk that publicly financed voucher programs pose in terms of religiously
based social conflict" and to note his belief that, whatever the policy merits of
that we somehow want it to be more pallid when people of different faiths disagree."); Steven D. Smith,
supra note 14, at 1248 ("In other contexts .... (when we are in a freedom of speech mode, for
example), we may view the phenomena that comprise contention almost as positive goods: far from
wringing our hands about the possibility of civil strife, we say that democracy thrives on public debate
that is 'robust,' 'vehement,' and 'caustic."' (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964))).
26. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 (2005).
27. RICHARD DAWKINS, A DEVIL'S CHAPLAIN: REFLECIONS ON HOPE, LIES, SCIENCE AND LOVE 161
(2003).
28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
29. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 825 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("The dissent resurrects the
concern for political divisiveness that once occupied the Court but that post-Aguilar cases have rightly
disregarded."). But see id. at 872 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) ('The Court may well have moved away
from considering the political divisiveness threatened by particular instances of aid as a practical
criterion for applying the Establishment Clause case by case, but we have never questioned its
importance as a motivating concern behind the Establishment Clause, nor could we change history to
find that sectarian conflict did not influence the Framers who wrote it.").
30. See 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
31. According to the Chief Justice, "the Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It
provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and
residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among
options public and private, secular and religious." Id. at 662. In my view, Zelman was correctly decided
and defensibly reasoned and the decision's conclusion and premises are normatively attractive. See
generally Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amendment, and Social
Justice, 4 Thx. REv. L. & POL. 301 (2000); Richard W. Garnett, Brown's Promise, Blaine's Legacy, 17
CONST. COMMENT. 651 (2000) (reviewing JOSEPH P. VITERrI-n, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE
CONsTrnON, ANm CIVIL SOCIETY (1999)); Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School
Choice: Education, Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDozO L. REv. 1281 (2002)
[hereinafter Garnett, The Right Questions]. For a comprehensive analysis of the Zelman decision and
opinions, see, for example, Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional
Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (2003); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelmans Future: Vouchers,
Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 917 (2003);
Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
1672 [Vol. 94:1667
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such programs,32 the need to "protect[] the Nation's social fabric from religious
conflict pose[d] an overriding obstacle" to the Ohio experiment.33
For Justice Breyer, in other words, avoiding "religiously based social con-
flict" and "social dissension" is not merely a policy desideratum, or the irenic
aspiration of prudent leaders and civic-minded citizens, or an injunction of
political morality.34 It is also a fundamental constitutional "principle. '35 And
while he did not endorse a strict, no-aid form of separationism, 36 Justice Breyer
nonetheless warned that:
In a society composed of many different religious creeds, I fear that this
present departure [upholding Ohio's voucher program] from the Court's
earlier understanding risks creating a form of religiously based social conflict
potentially harmful to the Nation's social fabric.... I believe the Establish-
37ment Clause was written in part to avoid this kind of conflict ....
32. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Ohio's voucher program was
"well-intentioned").
33. Id. Justice Breyer also repeatedly voiced concerns about "divisiveness" during the oral argu-
ments in the Ten Commandments cases, Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union of Kentucky. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15-16, Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct.
2854 (2005) (No. 03-1500) ("There is no way to [determine whether the government has gone too far in
allowing a religious display] other than to look at the divisive quality of the individual display case by
case. And when I do that, I don't find much divisiveness here."); Transcript of Oral Argument at 34-35,
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (No. 03-1693) ("[T]he government is not
absolutely forbidden by the establishment clause to recognize the religious nature of the people nor the
religious origins of much of our law.., but it's easy to go too far and.., you are [treading] on eggs to
become far more divisive than you hoped and really end up with something worse than if you stayed
out in the first place. In other words, it's a very delicate matter and it's very easy to offend people.").
34. See Michael J. Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Is Not Illegiti-
mate in a Liberal Democracy, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 217, 229 (2001) (distinguishing, for purposes of
the debate over the role of religiously grounded arguments in public discourse, between the demands of
constitutional law and those of a liberal democracy's political morality).
35. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 723, 724 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. "Separation" and "separationism" are more complex notions than this introductory characteriza-
tion of Justice Breyer's alms suggests. See generally, e.g., PiULI' HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF Catncri
AND STATE (2002); Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. Cm. L. REv. 1667
(2003) (reviewing HAmmURGER, supra); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 230 (1994); Steven D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J.L. & POL. 215 (2002); John
Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1869 (2003) (reviewing HAmBuRGER,
supra).
37. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 728-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also stated that, in a "society
as religiously diverse as ours, the Court has recognized that we must rely on the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment to protect against religious strife." Id. at 725; see also id. at 686 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("I have been influenced by my understanding of the impact of religious strife on the
decisions of our forebears to migrate to this continent, and on the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans,
Northern Ireland, and the Middle East to mistrust one another. Whenever we remove a brick from the
wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and
weaken the foundation of our democracy."); id. at 716-17 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("If the divisiveness
permitted by today's majority is to be avoided in the short term, it will be avoided only by action of the
political branches at the State and national levels.").
Professor Feldman, in Divided By God, endorses Justice Breyer's view, insisting that "state financial
aid for religious institutions does not encourage common values; it creates conflict and division."
2006] 1673
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Justice Breyer's point, then, is not simply that the absence of such strife is a
happy result of scrupulous judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause or
a motivating hope of those who drafted and ratified it.38 Instead, his claim is
that the identification, prevention, and elimination of "religious strife" are
integral parts of the Court's interpretive, expositive, and enforcement tasks.
That is, the construction of a "social fabric" free of "religiously based social
conflict" is more than a desirable result of obeying and enforcing our Constitu-
tion's no-establishment command-it is the command itself.39
Now, in Zelman, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded only briefly to Justice
Breyer's invocation of the "invisible specters of 'divisiveness' and 'religious
strife. ' ' 40 With respect to the proposed constitutional "principle" of "avoiding
religiously based social conflict," the Chief Justice thought it was "unclear
exactly what sort of principle Justice Breyer [had] in mind, considering that the
program has ignited no 'divisiveness' or 'strife' other than this litigation. ' 4 He
also wondered "where Justice Breyer would locate this presumed authority to
deprive Cleveland residents of a program that they have chosen but that we
subjectively find 'divisive.' 42 Here, the Chief Justice might just as well have
quoted Chief Justice Burger's concession in Lemon: "Ordinarily political debate
and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy
FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 245. He warns also that legislative and other debates about the details of
voucher programs are a "recipe for real and deep division." Id. at 246. I disagree. See, e.g., Garnett, The
Right Questions, supra note 31, at 1299-1300.
38. Cf., e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that
"principles of separation and neutrality help assure that essentially religious issues, precisely because of
their importance and sensitivity, not become the occasion for battle in the political arena").
39. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHL L. REv. 195, 198
(1992) (noting that the Establishment Clause "extinguished" "inter-denominational strife"); id. at
209-10 (contending that the Establishment Clause forbids certain government measures "because
[they] will cause profound divisiveness and offense" (emphasis added)). Cf Andrew Koppelman,
Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 125 (2002) (stating that "[eindorsing some citizens' [religious]
beliefs and repudiating others, as [Justice Scalia's reading of the Establishment Clause] would do,
would be politically divisive" and therefore "out of sync with the reasons for the Establishment
Clause").
40. 536 U.S. at 662 n.7. Chief Justice Rehnquist had previously expressed skepticism about the
constitutional relevance in Establishment Clause cases of "political divisiveness." See, e.g., Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) ("We also disagree with the District Court's conclusion that
the AFLA is invalid because it is likely to create political division along religious lines. It may well be
that because of the importance of the issues relating to adolescent sexuality there may be a division of
opinion along religious lines as well as other lines. But the same may be said of a great number of other
public issues of our day." (citation omitted)); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.ll (1983) (stating
that the question of "political divisiveness" should be "regarded as confined to cases where direct
financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools").
41. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662 n.7. Justice O'Connor made a similar point, nearly twenty years ago,
dissenting in Aguilar v. Felton: "It is curious indeed to base our interpretation of the Constitution on
speculation as to the likelihood of a phenomenon which the parties may create merely by prosecuting a
lawsuit." Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984) ("A
litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit .... create the appearance of divisiveness and
then exploit it as evidence of entanglement.").
42. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662 n.7.
1674 [Vol. 94:1667
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manifestations of our democratic system of government ... Judicial squea-
mishness toward contentious and messy politics, Chief Justice Rehnquist might
have suggested, is not a particularly sound doctrinal tool, let alone a reliable
constitutional benchmark."
Still, Justice Breyer's arguments and concerns seem to fit the times. Hardly a
day goes by without bold-print, full-volume reminders from pollsters and
pundits that American society is fractured, split, polarized, partisan-even at
"war"s-and that it is, about many things and in many ways, "divided. 46 We
are, according to Gertrude Himmelfarb, "One Nation, Two Cultures. '47 We are,
political guru Michael Barone tells us, "Hard America" and "Soft America.
48
We are, as commentator David Brooks and many others have colorfully de-
scribed, Bobos and Patio Men, Latte and Sprinkler Towns.4 9 We are Retro and
Metro,50 Fahrenheit 9/11 and The Passion,5 1 Wal-Mart and Whole Foods,52
43. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622; cf Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First
Amendment, 78 CHI.-KENr L. Rav. 531, 559 (2003) (suggesting that "conflict" between "differing views
of justice and the common good" is an "inherent part of law and politics in a liberal democratic
society").
44. See Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REv.
1337, 1359 (1990) (criticizing as "idolatry" the "kind of aversion and squeamishness towards open
political conflict displayed by [supporters of a flag-burning amendment]"); see also Richard H. Pildes,
Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 717 (2001) (noting that "in the political realm, we
cling.., tenaciously to the fear that too much politics, or too competitive a political system, will bring
instability, fragmentation, and disorder"); cf, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
("[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically. This is conduct that
shocks the conscience.").
45. See, e.g., KEVIN SEAMUs HASSON, THE RIGHT To BE WRONG: ENDING THE CULTURE WAR IN AMERICA
OVER RELIGION (2005); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
(1991).
46. See, e.g., ROGER SIMON, DIVIDED WE STAND: How AL GoRE BEAT GEORGE BUSH AND LOST THE
PRESIDENCY (2001).
47. GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTURES: A SEARCHING EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN
SOCIETY IN THE AFTERMATH OF OUR CULTURAL REVOLUTION (2001); see also, e.g., STANLEY B. GREENBERG,
THE TWO AMERICAS: OUR CURRENT POLrTCAL DEADLOCK AND How To BREAK IT (2004); E.J. Dionne, One
Nation Deeply Divided, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2003, at A31 ("The red states get redder, the blue states get
bluer, and the political map of the United States takes on the coloration of the Civil War."); David Von
Drehle, Political Split Is Pervasive, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2004, at Al ("American politics appears to be
hardening into uncompromising camps, increasingly identified with the two parties."); David Finkel, A
Liberal Life in the City by the Bay, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2004, at Al (profiling one of the nation's
"bluest" areas); David Finkel, For a Conservative, Life Is Sweet in Sugar Land, Tex., WASH. POST, Apr.
26, 2004, at Al (profiling one of the nation's "reddest" counties).
48. MICHAEL BARONE, HARD AMERICA, SOFT AMERICA: COMPETITION VS. CODDLING AND THE BATTLE FOR
THE NATION'S FUTURE (2004).
49. See generally, e.g., DAVID BROOKS, ON PARADISE DRIVE: How WE LIVE Now (AND ALWAYS HAVE)
IN THE FUTURE TENSE (2004); DAVID BROOKS, BOBOS IN PARADISE: THE NEW UPPER CLASS AND How THEY
GOT THERE (2001); David Brooks, One Nation, Slightly Divisible, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 53
[hereinafter Brooks, One Nation]; David Brooks, People Like Us, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, at 29
[hereinafter Brooks, People].
50. JOHN SPERLING ET AL., THE GREAT DIVIDE: RETRO v. METRO AMERICA (2004).
51. Sharon Waxman, Two Americas of "Fahrenheit" and "Passion": Urban Moviegoers for Anti-
Bush Documentary, Suburban Audience for Religious Epic, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, at El.
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"values evangelicals" and "legal secularists, 53 even Roundheads and Cava-
liers. 54 United we stand, perhaps; seated at the table, though, we seem intracta-
bly divided by Brooks's "meatloaf line." 55 Even our book-buying habits, The
New York Times reported not long ago, reveal a sharply and starkly "polarized
nation"; in line at Borders and Barnes & Noble, we are still two Americas,
"Red" and "Blue." 56 These alleged two Americas have different radio net-
works,57 live in increasingly segregated counties, use different online dating
services,59 inhabit and move through different parts of the "blogosphere," 6 and
it has even been suggested that they ought to fly different airlines.6 ' The cultural
cleavage is so deep, some say, that meaningful disagreement and argument are
no longer possible.62
52. See William Powers, The Great Shopping Divide, 36 NAT'L J. 3700 ("Are you a Wal-Mart
person, or a Whole Foods person?").
53. FELDSaN, supra note 9, at 7-8 (2005).
54. See Joel Kotkin, Red, Blue and... so 17th Century, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2004, at BI
(comparing the state of political affairs in mid-17th century England to those that obtain in the United
States today).
55. Brooks, One Nation, supra note 49, at 54 ("I've crossed the Meatloaf Line; from here on there
will be a lot fewer sun-dried-tomato concoctions on restaurant menus and a lot more meatloaf
platters.").
56. Readers Split, Left, Right (And Center), N.Y. TmiEs, Mar. 13, 2004, at B7 ("A study of purchase
patterns of political books reveals that buyers of liberal books ... tend to buy only other liberal books,
while buyers of conservative books... usually buy only other conservative books.").
57. See Howard Kurtz, Making a Left at the Mike: New Radio Network To Take Liberal Leap, WASH.
POST, Mar. 21, 2004, at Dl.
58. See Bill Bishop, The Growing Cost of Political Uniformity, AusTIN Am.-STATESMAN, Apr. 8,
2004, at A-1 (noting that "[m]ost Americans live in counties that haven't changed their party preference
in presidential elections in more than a generation" and, in recent decades, "[pilace aligned with ideol-
ogy, which aligned with party. Like-minded people came to live in the same place, which made it more
likely that the group would polarize"); Brooks, People, supra note 49, at 29 ("[Elvery place becomes
more like itself .... Once [people] find a town in which people share their values, they flock there, and
reinforce whatever was distinctive about the town in the first place.").
It is worth noting, though, that American counties-and particularly suburban ones-are increasingly
less segregated on the basis of race. According to data compiled by John Logan of the Mumford Center
for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, segregation between blacks and whites at the county
level declined by 3.7% during the same time that segregation by major-party affiliation increased by
47%. See Timothy Noah, Mister Landslide's Neighborhood, SLATE, Apr. 7, 2004, http://www.slate.com/
id/2098387/ (discussing Logan study).
59. See Noah Schachman, Online Matchmakers Give Dating a Partisan Tilt, N.Y. Ttas, July 22,
2004, at G8.
60. See Lada Adamic & Natalie Glance, The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. Election:
Divided They Blog (Mar. 4, 2005), http://www.blogpulse.com/papers/2005/AdarnicGlanceBlogWWW.
pdf.
61. See David Brooks, Fly the Partisan Skies, N.Y. TIM , Apr. 6, 2004, at A23.
62. See CHRUSTOPHER LASCH, THE REvOLT OF a ELTrrEs 80-81 (1995) ("[H]aving sealed [ourselves]
off from arguments and events that might call [our] own convictions into question, [we] no longer
attempt to engage [our] adversaries in debate."). Professor Robert Nagel sounded a similar alarm:
Disagreement about issues like abortion, homosexuality, and the place of religion in public
life is sufficiently profound and systematic as to suggest that Americans are split by two
fundamentally different worldviews. The danger is that this division is too wide for discourse
or compromise, indeed, too wide for any peaceful resolution.
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To be sure, these "two cultures" and "Red State, Blue State" arguments are
controversial and contestable. The political-polarization thesis should not be
pushed too far, and our divisions should not be exaggerated. 63 Still, there is no
avoiding the fact that, as Justice Breyer feared, our social and political fault-
lines often trace, even if they are not reducible or even attributable to, religious
convictions and denominational differences. "We are," Professor Feldman has
recently observed, "increasingly, a nation divided by God."64 In Barone's
words, "Americans increasingly vote as they pray, or don't pray. ' 65 Accord-
ingly, two social scientists have proposed that one of our two major political
parties is most usefully and accurately characterized as "secularist. '66 And, as if
to return the favor, members of that party are sometimes heard to charge that the
other, presumably non-"secularist" party is in the grip of the "Taliban wing of
American politics."
67
ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 3 (2001) (footnote omitted).
63. See, e.g., MORmS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2005);
ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT: GOD,
COUNTRY, FAMILY, RACISM, WELFARE, IMMIGRATION, HoMoSExuALITY, WORK, THE RIGHT, THE LE, AND
EACH OTHER (1998); Jonathan Rauch, Bipolar Disorder, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 2005, at 102, 102
("America today is divided over the question whether America is divided."); Michael Robinson &
Susan Ellis, Purple America, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 16-23, 2004, at 27 ("The theory of red states
versus blue states is about as wide of the mark as it is widely accepted."); Robert J. Samuelson,
Polarization Myths, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2003, at A29 ("What's actually happened is that our political
and media elites have become polarized, and they assume that this is true for everyone else. It isn't.");
John Tierney, A Nation Divided? Who Says?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, § 4, at 1.
64. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 235.
65. Amy Sullivan, Do The Democrats Have a Prayer?, WASH. MONTHLY, June 2003, at 30 ("Today,
conventional wisdom holds that the best way to predict a person's party affiliation is to ask how often
they go to church. As political commentator Michael Barone has noted, 'Americans increasingly vote
as they pray, or don't pray."'). A widely noted Pew Forum study appears to confirm Barone's quip. See
News Release, The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Religion and Politics: Contention and
Consensus (July 24, 2003), http://pewforum.orglpublications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf ("Religion is
a critical factor these days in the public's thinking about contentious policy issues and political
matters."). A more recent Pew Forum study confirms: "By far the most powerful new reality at the
intersection of religion and politics is this: Americans who regularly attend worship services and hold
traditional religious views increasingly vote Republican, while those who are less connected to
religious traditions and more secular in their outlook tend to vote Democratic." PEw F. ON RELIGION &
PUB. LIFE, TRENDS 2005, at 26 (2005), http://pewresearch.org/assetslfiles/trends2005-religion.pdf; see
also, e.g., PEw RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, EVENLY DIVIDED AND INCREASINGLY
POLARZED: 2004 POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 7 (2003), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/196.pdf ("[T]his
remains a country that is almost evenly divided politically-yet further apart than ever in its political
values."); James L. Guth et al., America Fifty/Fifty, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2001, at 22 ("Clearly there is a
new religious order in American electoral politics, one characterized not only by the distinctive
partisanship of religious traditions, but also by theological polarization within the nation's three largest
traditions."); id. at 25 ("Religion played a key role in determining both the partisan polarization and the
disengagement that characterized the public in 2000.").
66. Louis Bolce & Gerald DeMaio, Our Secularist Democratic Party, PUB. INT., Fall 2002, at 3.
Sociologist Alan Wolfe, however, suggests that the Democratic Party is itself divided over the question
of "religion itself and the role it ought to play in public life." Alan Wolfe, The God Gap: How Religion
Divides the Democrats, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2004, at D1.
67. Charles Krauthammer, What Makes the Bush Haters So Mad?, TIME, Sept. 22, 2003, at 84
(noting that Julian Bond of the NAACP "speaks of [President] Bush's staffing his Administration with
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Justice Breyer's solicitude for our "social fabric" and his concern about
"social dissension" resonate not only with the hand-wringing of cultural critics
and with internet-salon chatter; they are timely in other ways, too. For example,
an exchange between Chief Justice Rehnquist and pro se litigant Michael
Newdow regarding the assertedly "divisive" character of the terms "Under
God" was among the highlights of the oral arguments in the Pledge of Alle-
giance case a few years ago.68 In that same case, Justice O'Connor noted, in a
concurring opinion outlining her view that the Pledge is constitutionally permis-
sible, that "the practice has been employed pervasively without engendering
significant controversy., 69 And, the deciding fifth vote to allow a Ten Command-
ments monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol hinged on Justice
Breyer's conclusions that, on balance and all things considered, the "display
[was] unlikely to prove divisive" and that, in fact, a ruling against the display
could "create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establish-
ment Clause seeks to avoid.",
70
It is worth noting that the theme sounded in these and other Establishment
Clause cases is consonant with a number of important debates and develop-
ments in First Amendment law: In recent court decisions and scholarship
addressing campaigns, advertising, political parties, and elections, the argument
is often pressed that the First Amendment not only permits, but perhaps even
requires, governments to manage benevolently the content and tone of political
'the Taliban wing of American politics"'); see also Bolce & DeMaio, supra note 66, at 13 (contending
that "[o]ne has to reach back to pre-New Deal America, when political divisions between Catholics and
Protestants encapsulated local ethno-cultural cleavages over prohibition, immigration, public education,
and blue laws, to find a period when voting behavior was influenced by [the current] degree of
antipathy toward a religious group [i.e., 'fundamentalists']"); Democrats Eye Janklow's House Seat,
WASH. POST, May 31, 2004, at A6 (noting Sen. Tim Johnson's expressed desire to "send a message to
the 'Taliban wing' of the Republican party").
68. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-45, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004) (No. 02-1624). Mr. Newdow observed that "the country went [berserk] because people were so
upset that God was going to be taken out of the Pledge of Allegiance," and suggested that this fact
tended to show that the inclusion by Congress of the term "Under God" in the Pledge was "divisive."
Id. at 44. Chief Justice Rehnquist then asked "what the vote was in Congress apropos of divisiveness to
adopt the Under God phrase?" Id. When told by Mr. Newdow that the vote was "apparently unani-
mous," the Chief Justice observed wryly, "Well, that doesn't sound divisive." Id. Mr. Newdow's
retort-"that's only because no atheist can get elected to public office"-was apparently greeted with
boisterous applause, causing the Chief Justice to threaten to clear the gallery. Id. at 44-45.
69. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 38 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment). Indeed, she continued, "[g]iven the vigor and creativity of [Establishment Clause challenges
over the years], I find it telling that so little ire has been directed at the Pledge." Id. at 39.
70. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2871 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); cf id. at 2897 (Souter,
J., dissenting) ("I doubt that a slow walk to the courthouse, even one that took 40 years, is much
evidentiary help in applying the Establishment Clause.").
Justice Breyer's conclusion that, on balance, the divisiveness "costs" of removing the display were
likely to outweigh removal's cohesiveness "benefits" is consonant with the argument-advanced, for
example, by both Chris Eberle and Michael Perry-that the "divisiveness" argument against the
employment of religiously grounded moral arguments is, in the end, a consequentialist argument. See
MIcHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? REuGIous FAm AND LERAL DEMocRAcY 155-56 n.12, 162 n.41 (2003)
(discussing, inter alia, email correspondence with Chris Eberle).
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discourse.7' On this view, excessive divisiveness is a form of what Professor
Meiklejohn called "mutilation of the thinking process of the community against
which the First Amendment of the Constitution is directed.",72 With respect to
the Court's government-speech and public-forum doctrines, 3 a similar claim
seems to be at the heart of the tension between what Professors Volokh and
BeVier have called an "enhancement" or "elite management" model, on the one
hand, and a "distortion" model, on the other.7 4 The increasing uneasiness in
some quarters with relying solely on counter-speech and thick skins to remedy
the pain, offense, and strife caused by racist and hateful speech seems also of a
piece with Justice Breyer's divisiveness argument.75 Even the controversy
surrounding the Boy Scouts' asserted expressive-association right to exclude
openly gay leaders and spokesmen might fairly be cast as a debate about how
far into civil society and into the realm of voluntary associations the govern-
ment's discourse-shaping authority and anti-"division" efforts may reach.76
These and other developments provide support for Roberto Unger's observa-
tion a decade ago that one of the "dirty little secrets of contemporary jurispru-
dence" is its "discomfort with democracy., 77 But one need not question the
"comfort" with democracy of scholars like Owen Fiss 7 8 and Cass Sunstein79 to
note the consonance between the political-divisiveness argument and their
71. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245, 252-53 (2002)
("[T]he First Amendment's constitutional role is not simply one of protecting the individual's 'negative'
freedom from governmental restraint. The Amendment in context also forms a necessary part of a
constitutional system designed to sustain that democratic self-government. The Amendment helps to
sustain the democratic process both by encouraging the exchange of ideas needed to make sound
electoral decisions and by encouraging an exchange of views among ordinary citizens necessary to their
informed participation in the electoral process.").
72. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960) (emphasis omitted).
73. For more on these doctrines, see generally, for example, Randall P Bezanson, The Government
Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953
(1998); Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1377 (2001); Richard W. Garnett, Less Is More: Justice Rehnquist, the Freedom of Speech, and
Democracy, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 26 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006); Michael W. McConnell, The
Selective Funding Problem: Abortion and Religious Schools, 104 HARv. L. REV. 989 (1991).
74. See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1266-76 (1994); Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In
Defense of Categories, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 79, 102-18; Eugene Volokh, Shift Shows, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE, June 28, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-volokh062802.asp.
75. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 10 (1998).
76. Cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[E]very state
law prohibiting discrimination is designed to replace prejudice with principle .... "). See generally
Larry Alexander, Illiberalism All the Way Down: Illiberal Groups and Two Conceptions of Liberalism,
12 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 625 (2002).
77. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 72 (1996). Unger notes
that this "discomfort with democracy shows up in every area of contemporary legal culture," including
"in an ideal of deliberative democracy as most acceptable when closest in style to a polite conversation
among gentlemen in an eighteenth-century drawing room .... I d. at 72-73.
78. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 75, at 19 ("The phrase 'freedom of speech' implies an organized and
structured understanding of freedom, one that recognizes certain limits as to what should be included
and excluded. This is the theory upon which speech regulation that aims to protect national security or
public order is sometimes allowed; it should be equally available when the state is trying to preserve the
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positions regarding the extent to which the First Amendment authorizes, and
even demands, efforts by government to "promot[e] a well-functioning system
of free speech.",80 In a similar vein, the recent publication-to glowing re-
views8 1 -of Justice Breyer's Tanner Lectures confirms that we can expect
continued and vigorous defenses of the role of courts in promoting, through
constitutional interpretation and judicial review, conditions in society and capaci-
ties of citizens thought conducive to better politics. 82 At the same time, Richard
Pildes, Mark Tushnet, and others have expressed and developed their concern
that "in the political realm, judges and others cling ... tenaciously to the fear
that too much politics, or too competitive a political system, will bring instabil-
ity, fragmentation, and disorder.,
83
Returning to Zelman: The Chief Justice was correct to observe that the Court
in recent years has "disregarded"-or, at least, carefully cabined-the "concern
for political divisiveness that once occupied the Court... ."8 At the same time,
though, Justice Breyer was able to marshal a number of precedents and a
plausible historical narrative to support his proffered no-strife principle. His
observation in Van Orden that a "basic purpose[]" of the Establishment Clause
was to "avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social con-
flict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike" would seem to
enjoy similar support. 85 And so, Chief Justice Rehnquist's questions need to be
fullness of debate. Indeed, the First Amendment should be more embracing of such regulation, since
that regulation seeks to further the democratic values that underlie the First Amendment itself.").
79. See, e.g., CASS StwsrEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 200 (2001) ("For citizens in a republic, freedom requires
exposure to a diverse set of topics and opinions. This is not a suggestion that people should be forced to
read and view materials that they abhor. But it is a claim that a democratic polity, acting through
democratic organs, tries to promote freedom, not simply by respecting consumer sovereignty, but by
creating a system of communication that promotes exposure to a wide range of issues and views."); see
also id. at 142 ("My basic argument... is that the free speech principle, properly understood .... does
not bar government from taking steps to ensure that communications markets serve democratic
self-government and other important social values.").
80. SutSTEIN, supra note 20, at 109.
81. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Memo to John Roberts, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2005, at T5; Cass
Sunstein, The Philosopher-Justice, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 19, 2005, at 29.
82. See STEPHEN BREXER, AcrivE LmERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMocRAInC CoNsTIrrUnON (2005); see
also Breyer, supra note 71.
83. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REv. 28, 130
(2004) ("In my view, constitutional law should be oriented more toward the dangers of legislative and
partisan self-entrenchment and less toward a perceived judicial need to ensure a democratic stability
adequately secured already by the underlying institutional structures of American democracy."); see
also, e.g., MARK TusHNET, TAKING THE CoNsTITUTION AWAY FROM me COuRTS (1999).
84. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 n.7 (2002) (quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793, 825 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
85. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). I should emphasize
here that it is not necessary for purposes of this Article to dispute that many of those who called for,
drafted, debated, and ratified the First Amendment hoped that the provision would, among other things,
forestall or reduce strength-sapping, religion-based social conflict. Cf., e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome potential of
sectarian religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil strife."). Professor Feldman supplies a
nice quotation, from an "anonymous Virginia Federalist" who brushed off concerns that Congress
1680 [Vol. 94:1667
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answered: "What sort of principle" did Justice Breyer have in mind, and where
would he locate the Court's "authority to deprive Cleveland residents of a
program that they have chosen but that [the Justices] subjectively find 'divi-
sive'"?86 This Article seeks to answer these and other questions.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE POLITIcAL-DIvIsIVENESS ARGUMENT
The prominence of concerns about religion and division in Justice Breyer's
opinions in Zelman and Van Orden, and in popular and political discourse more
generally, suggests a renewal of interest in the Argument. Before turning to the
Argument's content and the implications of its revival, I sketch in this Part its
genealogy, canvassing its pre-Lemon roots as well as its post-Lemon develop-
ment.
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE ARGUMENT
Warnings about division and calls for unity are nothing new. They have long
been a staple of American politics and even of the American creed. The same is
true of concerns about the alleged balkanizing effects of religion and its
tendency to unsettle political life by spilling over into it.87 Madison famously
observed, in his Memorial and Remonstrance, that "intermedd[ling] with Reli-
gion" by government can only "destroy... moderation and harmony" and is an
"enemy to the public quiet."' 88 The separationism of Thomas Jefferson and his
turn-of-the-century political allies reflected, at least in part, their irritation at the
might establish religion: Such a move, he said, would "disturb the union, ... destroy justice, excite civil
commotions and religious feuds, and ... annihilate religious liberty." Noah Feldman, The Intellectual
Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 346, 400 (2002) (citation omitted). Still, as
Justice Brennan observed, concurring in McDaniel v. Paty: "The mere fact that a purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife, does not place religious
discussion, association, or political participation in a [less preferred] status .... " McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). What's more, Kurt Lash has observed that "[w]hatever
constitutional life 'political divisiveness' had at the Founding, it was extinguished with the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment.... [T]hose who supported the Fourteenth Amendment not only intended
to protect 'divisive' political/religious activity, they most likely celebrated its most recent accomplish-
ment." E-mail from Kurt Lash, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles, to Richard Garnett,
Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School (Jan. 31, 2001) (on file with author).
86. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662 n.7.
87. Of course, it is also true that American leaders and citizens have long and often turned and
appealed to religious faith as a vehicle for arriving at civic unity. See, e.g., Robert N. Bellah, Civil
Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967) (citing and discussing, inter alia, Lincoln's Second
Inaugural and Gettysburg Addresses); see also Martin E. Marty, The Widening Gyres of Religion and
Law, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 651, 661 (1996) ("The eighteenth-century framers of constitutional-
ism ... made clear during three decades of argument.., that they did understand religion's potential
for defining and 'binding' a people, just as it had the potential for unsettling them and being disruptive
in their civic life.").
88. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted
in FOUNDING THE REPUBLIC: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 89, 92 (John J. Patrick ed., Greenwood Press
1995). In an October 3, 1785 letter to George Mason, George Washington sounded a similar tone,
expressing his wish that the Assessment Bill-about which he was not particularly "alarmed"-"could
die an easy death," which would "be productive of more quiet to the State, than by enacting it into a
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political aims and effects of Federalist clergy's preaching.89 After the Civil War,
the tumult surrounding the threats to American nationhood thought to be posed
by Catholic immigration and religion included prominent and passionate invoca-
tions of unity and denunciations of division and sectarianism. 90 James Blaine,
for instance, highlighting the need for the proposed constitutional amendment
that bears his name, insisted that the Grant-era debates over the school question
"inevitably arouse[] sectarian feelings, and lead[] to the bitterest and most
deplorable of all strifes, the strifes between religious denominations." 9 Later,
during another time of national reflection about unity and cohesion, public
intellectuals like Paul Blanshard lamented the persistence and influence of
Catholic schools, "the most important divisive instrument[s] in the life of
American children.",92 This complaint was consonant with Justice Frankfurter's
claim, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, that, in the interest of
"promoting our common destiny" through the public schools, these schools
must be purged of and protected from all "divisive forces. 9 3 Indeed, as
Professor Feldman has described, a concern for the construction and mainte-
nance of "national unity" runs through a number of Justice Frankfurter's
mid-century opinions.94 He wrote, for example, in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, that "[t]he ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of
cohesive sentiment," emphasizing that "the flag is the symbol of our national
unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the framework
of the Constitution.
95
It still remained, though, for these and the many other antidivision, civic-
Law." Letter from George Washington to George Mason (Oct. 3, 1785), http://teachingamericanhistory.
org/library/index.asp?document= 305.
89. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 111-43. As Professor Hamburger puts it, "Federalist
ministers felt obliged to bring their faith to bear upon party politics, especially against the man
who ... was notorious for suggesting that religion and morality and thus also religion and politics were
specialized, less than fully integrated, features of human life." Id. at 112. At the same time, some on the
other side warned-also foreshadowing contemporary discussions-that "[p]olitical wranglings, and
party strife... [would] inflict ... deep and dangerous wounds" on religious communities and congrega-
tions. Id. at 131.
90. See generally CiARLES L. GLENN, THE MrT OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); LLOYD P. JORGEN-
SON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL (1987); JOHN T. McGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN
FREEDOM: A HISTORY 91-126 (2003). The worry of many "leading Republican politicians, ministers, and
editors" was that "an international church threatened national unity ...." MCGREEVY, supra, at 93.
91. FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 75 (quoting James Blaine).
92. Id. at 166 (quoting PAUL BLANsHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949)).
93. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
see also Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90
CAL. L. REV. 673, 684-87, 695-98 (2002).
94. See FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 154-63.
95. 310 U.S. 586, 586, 596 (1940). Just a few years later, of course, the Court changed course,
repudiating its Gobitis ruling in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
"For Frankfurter," Professor Feldman notes, "the Barnete case was fundamentally about the relation-
ship between religion and American national identity, and in his view, the key to that relationship was
transcendence of religious difference or particularity at the national level." FELDMAN, supra note 9, at
160.
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unity arguments to be captured and operationalized in Establishment Clause
doctrine. Concluding his short essay in 1969 on the Court's decision in Board of
Education v. Allen,96 in which the Justices rejected an Establishment Clause
challenge to a New York law authorizing public schools to loan textbooks in
secular subjects to students attending parochial schools, Professor Paul Freund
commented:
Ordinarily I am disposed, in grey-area cases of constitutional law, to let the
political process function. Even in dealing with basic guarantees I would
eschew a single form of compliance and leave room for different methods of
implementation .... The religious guarantees, however, are of a different
order. While political debate and division is normally a wholesome process
for reaching viable accommodations, political division on religious lines is
one of the principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall. It was
healthy when President Kennedy, as a candidate, was able to turn off some of
the questions addressed to him on church-state relations by pointing to
binding Supreme Court decisions. Although great issues of constitutional law
are never settled until they are settled right, still as between open-ended,
ongoing political warfare and such binding quality as judicial decisions
possess, I would choose the latter in the field of God and Caesar and the
public treasury.
97
These reflections were constitutionalized-that is, they were incorporated into
one step of a three-part constitutional "test"-not many months later by Chief
Justice Burger in Lemon. 98 In that case, the Court ruled that the First Amend-
ment does not permit state actions that "foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion,"' 99 and also announced-relying explicitly on not
much more than Freund's comment-that a policy's "divisive political poten-
tial" not only indicates, but also constitutes, such impermissible entangle-
ment.100
96. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
97. Paul Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 IA-v. L. REv. 1680, 1691-92
(1969) (emphasis added); cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866-67
(1992) (joint opinion) ("Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in
such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare,
comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It
is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending
sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in
the Constitution.").
98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (citing Freund, supra note 97, at 1692.)
99. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
100. Id. at 622 ("A broader base of entanglement of yet a different character is presented by the
divisive political potential of these state programs. In a community where such a large number of pupils
are served by church-related schools, it can be assumed that state assistance will entail considerable
political activity."); see also Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious
Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J.
2006] 1683
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
B. THE LEMON "TEST" AND POLITICAL DIVISIVENESS ON RELIGIOUS LINES
Lemon's "test" is so familiar to lawyers and law students that few remember
the particulars of the laws considered or the details of the doctrine gathered and
applied. In Lemon, the Court invalidated two state statutes-one involving
"salary supplements" paid by Rhode Island to teachers at nonpublic schools and
the other authorizing the purchase by Pennsylvania of "secular educational
services" from such schools' 0 -- on the ground that "the cumulative impact of
the entire relationship arising under the statutes involves excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion."'10 2 Although this "relationship" was
carefully structured "to guarantee the separation between secular and religious
educational functions and to ensure that State financial aid supports only the
former,"'1 3 the Court determined that the supervision, oversight, monitoring,
and evaluation necessary to make good on that guarantee violated the Constitu-
tion no less than the harm the legislatures were trying to avoid.
Chief Justice Burger began his analysis with what today seems a striking
understatement: "Candor compels acknowledgment... that we can only dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of
constitutional law."1°4 In his view, the Lemon cases-and Establishment Clause
cases generally-were made even more difficult by the fact that the First
Amendment "[does] not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a
state religion"; it "command[s] that there should be 'no law respecting an
establishment of religion."",10 5 The Amendment imposes, in other words, a
broader prohibition than a mere ban on establishments: "A given law might not
establish a state religion but nevertheless be one 'respecting' that end in the
sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend the
First Amendment."'0 6 Accordingly, the challenge for the Court, as Burger saw
it, was to devise an analytical method appropriate to its sweeping mandate to
identify and forestall both the end of "establishment" and all possible steps
205, 214 (1980) (noting that, concerning the First Amendment's purpose, "Burger did not cite any
primary sources for his opinion.").
101. 403 U.S. at 602, 606-08 ("Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory program that provides financial
support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way of reimbursement for the cost of
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects. Rhode Island has
adopted a statute under which the State pays directly to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a
supplement of 15% of their annual salary.").
102. Id. at 614.
103. Id. at 613-14.
104. Id. at 612. Even in the course of setting the stage with what Chief Justice Burger no doubt
believed was an uncontroversial observation, he invites the question, "what, exactly, is so 'extraordinar-
ily sensitive' about this area of law?" See also, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the "importance and sensitivity" of "essentially religious issues").
Does the political-divisiveness argument, which this characterization foreshadows, rest in the end on
anything more than the Chief Justice's ipse dixit concerning the "sensitive" nature of this area of law?
105. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
106. Id.; see also, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973).
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toward it.
Chief Justice Burger was probably mistaken about the import of the Framers'
use of the word "respecting."' 107 In any event, having elected to assume that the
Establishment Clause bans more than establishments, he was left with the task
of distinguishing those not-quite-establishments that portend establishment from
those that do not. And, again, the fruit of Burger's efforts is the often-maligned,
but still breathing,10 8 three-part Lemon test: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion."' 10 9 The Justices satisfied
themselves quickly that the laws in question had the requisite secular pur-
pose, " ° and elected not to decide whether the arrangements created by these
laws had the prohibited primary effect of advancing religion.111 Instead, the
Court determined that the third part of its newly consolidated test-the "exces-
107. That is, the term "respecting" probably did not indicate a desire to forbid government actions
that were steps toward, or that might tend to result in, establishments of religion. Regarding the
significance of the word "respecting," Judge Noonan supplies the following imaginary dialogue
between a new judge and his law clerk:
[New Judge:] "I would have thought 'respecting an establishment' meant 'taking into account
an establishment'-in other words, the phrase in the Bill of Rights assumed that religious
establishments existed and instructed Congress not to take any establishment into account,
either by endowing a state-established church or by penalizing one. Am I being too simple?"
(Clerk:] "You're being pretty perceptive.... but you're a bit out of date. Everyone's agreed
that 'respecting an establishment' now means 'establishing.' They call it 'the Establishment
Clause.' It'd be sheer pedantry to stick to the original language."
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LusTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AmERcAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDoM
182-83 (1998).
108. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch?: A Comment on Professor Paulsen's Lemon is Dead,
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 883, 888 (1993) (arguing that, although the Lemon test may not be applied
mechanically by the Court in future cases, the test and its themes will continue to shape Establishment
Clause doctrine and to control in lower-court decisions); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993) (contending that the Court in Weisman replaced the Lemon test
with a new "coercion" test). Or, as Justice Scalia once put it, "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again .... Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))
(citations omitted).
110. The Court stated that "the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the
quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws." Id. at 613.
For background on the secular purpose requirement, see generally Koppelman, supra note 39.
111. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14 (avoiding the question whether "legislative precautions,"
employed to "guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to
ensure that State financial aid supports only the former," "restrict the principal or primary effect of the
programs to the point where they do not offend the Religion Clauses"). In Justice Brennan's view,
however, the salary-supplement programs in question were unconstitutional wholly and apart from the
"too close a proximity" or "entanglement" issue. Id. at 652 (Brennan, J., concurring). For Justice
Brennan, the direct subsidy by government, standing alone, to religious schools violated the Constitu-
tion. See id.; see also id. at 640 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("We have announced over and over again that
the use of taxpayers' money to support parochial schools violates the First Amendment .... ).
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sive entanglement" element-was sufficient to invalidate the statutes. 1 2
The "objective" of the Court's entanglement review, Chief Justice Burger
stated, "is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state]
into the precincts of the other."'1 3 That said:
[T]otal separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship
between government and religious organizations is inevitable.... Judicial
caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far
from being a "wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on
all the circumstances of a particular relationship. 114
The Court then turned to the "circumstances" and, after reviewing the "charac-
ter and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and
the religious authority," concluded that "both statutes foster an impermissible
degree of entanglement."
1 15
At this point, one might have thought that more than enough had been said
for the Court to strike down the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island laws: The laws
required monitoring and oversight of religious teachers, schools, and instruction
112. See id. at 614 ("[T]he cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in
each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion."). Strangely, though,
Chief Justice Burger provided little by way of historical or theoretical explanation of why, exactly,
"entanglement" is to be avoided or is prohibited by the Constitution. Justice Brennan, however,
elaborated in his concurring opinion on the "real dangers of 'the secularization of a creed."' Id. at 649
(Brennan, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 614 (majority opinion).
114. Id. (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 615. The Court observed that Rhode Island had "carefully conditioned its aid with
pervasive restrictions," the administration of which, the Court was confident, would "inevitably"
require "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" and would "involve exces-
sive and enduring entanglement between state and church." Id. at 619. And, the same was true, the
Chief Justice noted, with respect to the Pennsylvania program, which provided aid for teachers' salaries
directly to schools "controlled by religious organizations" and that "have the purpose of propagating
and promoting a particular religious faith." Id. at 620; see also id. at 628 (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[T]he raison d'etre of parochial schools is the propagation of a religious faith. They also teach secular
subjects; but they came into existence in this country because Protestant groups were perverting the
public schools by using them to propagate their faith. The Catholics naturally rebelled."); id. at 635
("No matter what the curriculum offers, the question is, what is taught? We deal not with evil teachers
but with zealous ones who may use any opportunity to indoctrinate a class." (citing LoP, AIm BoErrnR,,
ROMAN CATHOuCIsM 360 (1962) (emphasis added))); id. ("It is well known that everything taught in
most parochial schools is taught with the ultimate goal of religious education in mind."); id. at 635-36
("One can imagine what a religious zealot, as contrasted to a civil libertarian, can do with the
Reformation or with the Inquisition."); id. at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]eaching [of secular
subjects] cannot be separated from the environment in which it occurs, for its integration with the
religious mission is both the theory and the strength of the religious school."). But see id. at 663 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("Our prior cases have recognized the dual role of parochial schools in
American society: they perform both religious and secular functions."). As these quotations illustrate,
the Lemon Court's premises and conclusions with respect to the monitoring and supervision of teachers
and other activities in religious schools reflect a striking suspicion toward Catholic schools and their
mission.
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and these required entanglements invalidated the law. 116 However, Chief Justice
Burger went on to identify what he called "[a] broader base of entanglement of
yet a different character," namely, that "presented by the divisive political
potential of these state programs." 17 After all,
In a community where such a large number of pupils are served by church-
related schools, it can be assumed that state assistance will entail considerable
political activity. Partisans of parochial schools.., will inevitably champion
this cause and promote political action to achieve their goals. Those who
oppose state aid, whether for constitutional, religious, or fiscal reasons, will
inevitably respond and employ all of the usual political campaign techniques
to prevail.
118
In such a struggle, the Court asserted-without citing evidence" 9-"[i]t would
be unrealistic to ignore the fact that many people confronted with issues of this
116. In other words, the monitoring required by the Establishment Clause rendered the programs
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. Cf. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 627 (Douglas, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("The surveillance or supervision of the States needed to police the grants involved in
these three cases, if performed, puts a public investigator into every classroom and entails a pervasive
monitoring of these church agencies by the secular authorities. Yet if that surveillance or supervision
does not occur the zeal of religious proselytizers promises to carry the day and make a shambles of the
Establishment Clause."); id. at 634 (noting that either "school prayers, the daily routine of parochial
schools, must go" or "the state has established a religious sect"); id. at 668 (White, J., concurring)
("The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State and the parochial schools.").
In Tilton v. Richardson-which was decided the same day as Lemon-the Court concluded that a
federal program providing construction grants for buildings at church-related institutions of higher
education did not violate the Constitution. 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971). For Chief Justice Burger, the chief
distinction seemed to be that the colleges in question in Tilton-unlike the Roman Catholic elementary
schools at issue in Lemon--"were characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather than
religious indoctrination." Id. at 681. With respect to the entanglement question that was outcome-
determinative in Lemon, the Court concluded that the Constitution does not require monitoring of the
grants because "college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrina-
tion," the colleges themselves are "characterized by a high degree of academic freedom," the govern-
ment aid is of a "nonideological character," and the appropriations are not part of an annual budget
process. Id. at 685-88. In other words, the Constitution did not require monitoring that was itself
unconstitutional. The Court's entanglement-based conclusions were "merely reinforced" by the observa-
tion that "there was political division over the primary school aid programs, but not the college grant
programs." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 17.4, at 1193 (4th ed. 1991).
117. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622; see also, e.g., Brief for Protestants and Other Americans United for
Separation of Church and State as Amici Curiae, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970) (No. 89),
1970 WL 116836, at 12 ("It does not take any great cerebration to realize what a pandora's box of
religious strife will be opened if this new erosion of the principle of the separation of church and state is
permitted to undermine the foundation of the First Amendment.").
118. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. It is interesting to note that, to Chief Justice Burger, those who support
public assistance to parochial schools and their students are "partisans," while those who oppose school
aid are assumed to do so for "constitutional, religious, or fiscal reasons." Cf Brief for the United States
as Amici Curiae, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970) (No. 89), 1970 WL 116843, at 22 ("[The
divisiveness claim] is necessarily conjectural and is not subject to empiric demonstration. It poses
difficult political problems that are more appropriate for legislative than for judicial resolution.").
119. Cf Kenneth F. Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment,
27 UCLA L. REv. 1195, 1221-24 (1980) (discussing the Court's continued "use of a standard profile of
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kind will find their votes aligned with their faith."
1 20
The Chief Justice anticipated the obvious objection to this line of argument:
"Yes, people will fight about this. So what?" He conceded, as had Professor
Freund, that "[oirdinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or
even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system
of government, but political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect."'
12 1
And, to this historical claim about the intent underlying the First Amendment,
Burger added an argument that sounds more in political theory, or politics,
period: Even putting aside the aims of the Framers and ratifiers, "[t]he potential
divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political process" because
division on these issues "would tend to confuse and obscure other issues of
great urgency."' 2 2 We have, in other words, more important business to attend
to:
We have an expanding array of vexing issues, local and national, domestic
and international, to debate and divide on. It conflicts with our whole history
and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such
importance in our legislatures and in our elections that they could divert
attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of
government. 123
True, "(a)dherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take
strong positions on public issues"; indeed, "[w]e could not expect other-
wise."'124 Still, the Chief Justice insisted, the programs at issue in Lemon raised
the specter of "successive and very likely permanent annual appropriations
that"-unlike the tax exemption that the Court had upheld in Walz-"benefit
relatively few religious groups. Political fragmentation and divisiveness on
religious lines are thus likely to be intensified."'
' 25
Chief Justice Burger's opinion closed, finally, with a nod to the slippery-slope
religious institutions" (footnote omitted)); id. at 1226 (noting the "judgment that religiously motivated
activity has a particularly grave potential for causing discord in the civil society").
120. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. Chief Justice Burger's appeal to realism here invites the question:
"What is it about 'issues of this kind,' and not other 'kinds,' that should cause us to fear voting 'aligned
with faith'?" Cf id. at 612 ("Candor compels acknowledgment... that we can only dimly perceive the
lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.").
121. Id. at 622 (citing Freund, supra note 97, at 1692).
122. Id. at 622-23. The Court relies on Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 695
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1923), and Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
123. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
124. Id. (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 670) (parentheses in original).
125. Id. at 623. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas warned of yet another cause, or locus, of
division. In his view, the pervasive monitoring that the Constitution both required and prohibits would
itself-wholly and apart from the public and political debates about the programs and funding--"breed
division and dissension." Id. at 636 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Plolicing these grants to detect
sectarian instruction would be insufferable to religious partisans and would breed division and
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argument. 126 True, the Court in Walz had rejected, in light of the "more than 200
years of virtually universal practice imbedded in our colonial experience and
continuing into the present," the argument that the tax exemption upheld in that
case would "prove to be the first step in an inevitable progression leading to the
establishment of state churches and state religion."1 27 In Lemon, however, this
"progression" argument was found "more persuasive.' 28 The programs at issue
were, the Court asserted, "something of an innovation" and were likely to be
"self-perpetuating" and "self-expanding."'' 29 Chief Justice Burger reminded his
readers that "in constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were
thought to approach 'the verge,' have become the platform for yet further steps.
A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a 'downhill
thrust' easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop.' 1 30 Thus, entanglement
between government and religion is not only an "independent evil against which
the Religion Clauses were intended to protect," it serves also as a "warning
signal" that further evils are menacing.
1 3 '
In sum, Chief Justice Burger proposed in Lemon that the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause prohibits not only "establishments" of religion, but also
"step[s] that could lead to [them]" 32 ; that unlawfully excessive entanglement
between government and religion exists not only when the former's laws
purport to require or authorize intrusive oversight and monitoring of the internal
workings of the latter, but also when the state action in question has "divisive
political potential"'33 ; that, with respect to certain issues-particularly those
involving education funding-"many people.., will find their votes aligned
with their faith,,134; that the divisiveness fomented by this alignment is-unlike,
apparently, other alignments and divisions-"a threat to the normal political
process" because it "tend[s] to confuse and obscure other issues of great
urgency"1 35 ; and that political division along religious lines is an evil against
which the Establishment Clause was designed to protect and against which the
Court is therefore authorized to fight. 136 Animating all this, it appears, was
dissension between church and state."); id. at 640 (noting that the "surveillance needed" to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause "would breed only rancor and dissension").
126. For a detailed and provocative examination of slippery-slope arguments generally, see Eugene
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARv. L. Rav. 1026 (2003).




131. Id. at 624-25.
132. Id. at 612.
133. Id. at 622.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 622-23; see also id. at 623 ("It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to permit
questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our elections
that they could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of
government.").
136. See id. at 622.
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Chief Justice Burger's fundamental but unexamined premise that our "Constitu-
tion decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family,
and the institutions of private choice." 137 Religion is "divisive," because it is
private. Constitutional doctrine that forestalls religion-caused division is war-
ranted, and justifiable, in part because such doctrine is not seen as burdening
religion, but rather as confirming its nature and keeping it in its appropriate
sphere.
Again, Chief Justice Burger provided no evidence to support his observations
and predictions about the division associated with certain issues or for his
political judgment that certain issues are less important, and more distracting,
than others. Perhaps more curious, though, is the fact that he offered so little
authority for his central constitutional claim-i.e., that the political division
associated with, or predicted to attend, certain government programs is relevant
to the question whether those programs violate the Establishment Clause.
Instead, to support his "broader base of entanglement" argument, Chief Justice
Burger relied entirely on the few already-quoted sentences from Professor
Freund's 1969 comment 138 and on concurring opinions by Justices Harlan and
Goldberg in Walz, Board of Education v. Allen, and School District v. Schempp.
139
In Walz, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a tax
exemption for religious properties used for religious worship. While endorsing
without reservation the result reached by the Court, Justice Harlan emphasized
the importance of "preventing that kind and degree of government involvement
in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently
strain a political system to the breaking point."'140 For Justice Harlan, "neutral-
ity" and "voluntarism"-the two touchstones in Establishment Clause cases 14 -
stand in most cases as "barriers against the most egregious and hence divisive
,,142kinds of state involvement in religious matters. But not always: Also
invoking Professor Freund, Harlan noted that "governmental involvement, while
neutral, may be so direct or in such degree as to engender a risk of politicizing
religion."' 43 Observing that "religious groups inevitably represent certain points
of view and not infrequently assert them in the political arena," Harlan insisted
137. Id. at 625.
138. See supra text accompanying note 97.
139. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Indeed, Professor Gaffney, in his 1980 study, traced
the political-divisiveness argument to a "seed" planted by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in
Walz. See Gaffney, supra note 100, at 210.
140. Walz, 397 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
141. See id. at 695.
142. Id.
143. Id. By considering whether state action "politicizes" religion, Justice Harlan appears to miss the
significance of his own observation that religious believers and groups have views, and-not surpris-
ingly-often express these views. It is not entirely clear, then, what the difference is between
politicization by the state of religion and sanctification of politics by religion. Is religious activism an
indication that religion has been politicized by the state or simply that religion is doing what it does?
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that "history cautions that political fragmentation on sectarian lines must be
guarded against."' 44 Even under a neutral program that "entangle[s] the state in
details of administration and planning," the state's participation "may escalate
to the point of inviting undue fragmentation."1 45 Justice Harlan was satisfied,
however, that the tax exemption at issue in Walz "neither encourages nor
discourages participation in religious life"-and so complied with the "volunta-
rism" requirement-and also that the law was appropriately "neutral. 14 6
Justice Harlan had also highlighted his concern about political divisiveness a
few years earlier in Allen. 14 7 In that case, the Court upheld a New York law
requiring local public-school authorities to loan secular textbooks to students at
private and religious schools. Justice Harlan agreed with the result but wrote
separately to "emphasize certain of the principles which I believe to be central
to the determination of this case."' 148 His central points were that "the attitude of
government toward religion must.., be one of neutrality" and that "[n]eutrality
is, however, a coat of many colors." 14 9 In the end, he concluded, the Establish-
ment Clause permits activities that do not "significantly and directly" involve
the State "in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to... divisive influences
and inhibitions of freedom .... ,15o Similarly, in Schempp, Harlan joined Justice
Goldberg's opinion concurring in the Court's invalidation of state laws requir-
ing readings from the Bible in public schools, an opinion that warned against "a
brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active,
hostility to the religious."'' 51 These Justices agreed, however, that such state-
mandated uses of Scripture in government schools so crossed into "the realm of
the sectarian, as to give rise to those very divisive influences and inhibitions of
freedom which both religion clauses of the First Amendment preclude."
' 52
144. Id. at 695. Professor Gaffney suggests that Justice Harlan's worries here should be put in the
context of the "intense political involvement" of certain religious leaders and ministers at the time,
particularly with respect to the war in Vietnam. Gaffney, supra note 100, at 210 n.29; see also Walz,
397 U.S. at 670 ("Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong
positions on public issues including.., vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of
course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that right.").
145. Walz, 397 U.S. at 695 (citing also Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Allen and Justice
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Schempp).
146. Id. at 696.
147. See 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
151. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also id. ("Neither government nor this
Court can or should ignore the significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and
worship God and that many of our legal, political and personal values derive historically from religious
teachings.").
152. Id. at 307; see also FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 180 (observing that the "question of divisiveness"
was "squarely in view" in Schempp). Note Justice Goldberg's juxtaposition here-as if they were the
same or of similar constitutional import-of "divisive influences" and "inhibitions of freedom."
Shempp, 374 U.S. at 307.
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C. THE ARGUMENT'S DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT IN FUNDING CASES
The majority in Lemon constitutionalized Chief Justice Burger's short-form
understanding of an unexamined law-office history of the Establishment Clause
and the cautionary reservations and amorphous unease of Professor Freund and
Justices Harlan and Goldberg. And if, in Lemon, the Argument was presented as
lagniappe, as a "broader base of entanglement of yet a different character,"'' 53 it
would take on "a life of its own" just a few years later, in Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 154 The program at issue in that case
authorized direct money grants to designated nonpublic schools for maintenance
and repair of school buildings and also involved tuition grants and a tax-benefit
package for the low-income parents of nonpublic-school children.1 55 Here, it
was not the reality of administrative entanglement but the perceived prospects
for political conflict that did the work.
156
The precise role of judicial observations and predictions about division in
what Justice Powell called the Court's "weighing process" remained vague.
157
Still, Powell's elaboration for the Court of the Argument added to, or expanded
upon, Chief Justice Burger's in several interesting respects. 158 Justice Powell
took pains to establish, for example, that it was the bare fact of political
strife-and not the unattractiveness, on the merits, of the end results of that
strife-that was constitutionally significant.159 Like Burger, Powell conceded
that "the prospect of... divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation of
153. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
154. NOWAY & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, at 1193. In Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), "a form of
completely neutral aid-a tuition voucher plan-was stricken in part because of the belief that any
significant aid to students in sectarian schools caused political division." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 116, at 1193. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 659 (2002), of course, the Justices upheld a
school-voucher plan, but were able to distinguish Nyquist by noting that the program at issue in that
case provided aid only to private schools and private-school students, while many of the benefits of the
program at issue in Zelman were available to students attending public schools as well. The Court in
Zelman stated that "we now hold that Nyquist does not govern neutral educational assistance programs
that, like the program here, offer aid directly to a broad class of individual recipients defined without
regard to religion." Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.
155. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 761-69 (describing programs and laws at issue).
156. The Court acknowledged the valid, secular purpose behind the measures at issue, see id. at 773,
but concluded that they had the impermissible primary effect of "advancing religion," see id. at 789.
157. "One factor of recurring significance in this weighing process is the potentially divisive
political effect of an aid program." Id. at 795. In other words, the potentially divisive effects of a
program are significant in a weighing process that evaluates the States' "substantial reasons" against
"the relevant provisions and purposes of the First Amendment." See id. This does not suggest a precise
or predictable approach to the task of determining the constitutional validity of challenged programs.
158. Because of "the importance of the competing societal interests implicated here," Justice Powell
added and expanded upon the observation that "apart from any specific entanglement of the State in
particular religious programs, assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for entangle-
ment in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion." Id. at 794.
159. See id. at 795 & n.53 (noting, inter alia, that "[flew would question most of the legislative
findings supporting this statute" and that the "underlying reasons" for the laws were "substantial
reasons"; and quoting the lower court's statement that "[t]his litigation is, in essence, a conflict between
two groups of extraordinary good will and civic responsibility").
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state laws," while insisting that "it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to be
ignored."' 160 A "warning signal," though, of what? In Nyquist, the conflict that
appeared to occupy Powell's mind was not merely the predictable and tedious
squabbling about annual appropriations. 16 More dramatic and ominous, it was
the specter of "competition among religious sects for political and religious
supremacy"'' 62 that threatened to disrupt the political order.
1 63
During the decade or so following Nyquist, the Court, time and again,
confronted efforts by governments to provide educational aid, in various forms,
to children attending religious schools. In the published decisions that resulted,
the Justices' efforts to apply the Lemon test to programs involving slide
projectors, atlases, maps, standardized testing, and field trips were-as the
Justices could not help admitting1 6"-not always edifying. In these cases,
observations about and predictions of sectarian strife or political division along
religious lines were frequently offered as relevant to, if not outcome-
determinative of, a school-aid program's constitutional validity.
Thus, in Meek v. Pittinger,165 the Court employed the "clearly stated, if not
easily applied" Lemon test to invalidate a series of Pennsylvania laws that
authorized state-funded auxiliary services for children at private schools. 166
Along the way, the majority noted that, because the programs would require
continued annual appropriations, "the prospect of repeated confrontation be-
tween proponents and opponents of the auxiliary services" created potential
divisiveness along religious lines. 167 Chief Justice Burger, now in dissent,
160. Id. at 797-98.
161. Cf. id. at 797 & n.56 (observing that the political realities of expenditures, particularly annual
ones in times of scarcity and the "self-perpetuating tendencies of any form of government aid to
religion," when combined with the fact that "the underlying issue is the deeply emotional one of
Church-State relationships," are such that "the potential for seriously divisive political consequences
needs no elaboration").
162. Id. at 796 (noting that such competition has "occasioned considerable civil strife, 'generated in
large part' by competing efforts to gain or maintain the support of government" (quoting Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947))).
163. See id. ("[W]hat is at stake as a matter of policy... is preventing that kind and degree of
government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and
frequently strain a political system to the breaking point." (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397
U.S. at 694 (1970))). This concern with the efficient operation and integrity of the political system is a
consistent theme in Justice Powell's Establishment Clause opinions.
164. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often must seem arbitrary.").
165. 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
166. See id. at 358. These "auxiliary services" included remedial and accelerated instruction,
guidance counseling, testing, and speech and hearing services, psychological counseling, "and such
other secular, neutral, nonideological services as are of benefit to nonpublic school children and are
presently or hereafter provided for public school children of the Commonwealth." Id. at 352-53.
Pennsylvania had also authorized the loaning of state-owned textbooks to children in private schools,
see id. at 354, and this policy was-in light of Allen-easily upheld, see id. at 359-62.
167. Id. at 372. Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion, expanded on this observation, and insisted
that the majority had erred in too quickly equating the textbook provision at issue with the program
upheld in Allen. See id. at 379-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The latter
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responded by predicting that there was "at least as much potential for divisive
political debate in opposition to the crabbed attitude the Court shows in this
case."' 168 Of course, this criticism could have been applied with equal force to
his own opinion in Lemon. In his view, though, the provision of auxiliary
services that were equally available to public school children would not create
the same political divisiveness along religious lines as did the subsidized
teacher provisions in Lemon. 1
69
A few years later, in Wolman v. Walter,' 70 the Court considered a challenge to
an Ohio program that used public funds to pay for a wide range of educational
assistance, from standardized tests and test-scoring to maps, film projectors, and
bus service.171 While some portions of the program were upheld and others
were struck down, 172 the Argument appeared only at the margins and was
employed much as it had been in Meek. 173 Justice Brennan, for example,
recoiled from the "divisive political potential of unusual magnitude [that]
inhere[d] in the Ohio program." 174 Justice Marshall also emphasized that the aid
to be provided to religious schools "[was] certain to be substantial" and
concluded that it should not be provided "because of the dangers of 'political
divisiveness on religious lines.' 175 However, Justice Marshall's primary divisive-
ness-related concern was not the costs associated with the aid-after all, he
conceded that even costly "general welfare programs that serve children in
sectarian schools" could be permissible-but was instead the "sectarian func-
case, he now believed, had not appreciated the importance of the political-divisiveness specter-nor
had he in Lemon, he conceded. See id. at 383 n.3. In fact, he maintained, the Argument, if applied in
Meek, compelled the invalidation of the textbook provisions as well. See id. at 378-79.
168. Id. at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
169. See id. at 385-86.
170. 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
171. See id. at 233-34.
172. Ohio's efforts to loan to students or their parents certain nonreligious "instructional materials"-
projectors, tape recorders, maps, etc.-were invalidated on the ground that "[slubstantial aid to the
educational function of [religious] schools ... necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enter-
prise as a whole." Id. at 250 (quoting Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. at 366). The use of public funds for
"field trip transportation and services" for students in private schools was also invalidated. See id. at
254 ("[T]he public school authorities will be unable adequately to insure secular use of the field trip
funds without close supervision of the nonpublic teachers. This would create excessive entangle-
ment .... ). On the other hand, as in Meek, the Court permitted the lending of "secular" textbooks to
students attending private (and, in practice, overwhelmingly Catholic) schools. See id. at 237-38.
173. In several of the parties' briefs and briefs of amici, however, the argument was prominently
invoked. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellants at 21-22, Wolman, 433 U.S. 229 (No. 76-496), 1977 WL
189137 ("Nor has there been a lack of political divisiveness. In Ohio, as elsewhere, groups have formed
on both sides of these issues.., who have sought, often bitterly, to impress their points of view upon
the legislature .. "); Brief of The State Convention of Baptists in Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae at
26-27, Wolman, 433 U.S. 229 (No. 76-496), 1977 WL 189147 ("The Ohio legislature, bowing to
intensive lobbying, has attempted time and again to thread the needle between Allen and the various
other standards established by the Courts.... Rather than ending religious divisiveness, the adoption of
each new test and each attempt to distinguish Allen has brought new litigation and increased religious-
political strife.").
174. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. Id. at 259 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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tions of denominational schools."' 17 6 On the other hand, Justice Powell con-
tended that the Court's constitutional analysis should take appropriate account
of the fact that "[tihe risk of significant religious or denominational control over
our democratic processes or even of deep political division along religious lines
is remote ....,,77
In the following years, there was a move away from the political-divisiveness
inquiry and a general slackening of enthusiasm for finding excessive entangle-
ment in cases involving aid to religious schools and their activities. 17' That said,
assumptions and assertions about religion and divisiveness set the tone, if not
determined the outcomes, in two of the Court's more ill-starred Establishment
Clause cases, School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball 179 and Aguilar v. Fel-
ton.180 In Ball, the Court struck down a school district's "community education"
and "shared time" programs on the ground that they "advanced" religion. 8 The
Justices did not, in any depth, consider administrative-entanglement or political-
divisiveness arguments.1 82 Still, animating the Court's review was Justice Bren-
176. Id. at 259-60 ("[B]ecause general welfare programs do not assist the sectarian functions of
denominational schools, there is no reason to expect that political disputes over the merits of those
programs will divide the public along religious lines.").
Justice Marshall also stated that an appropriate appreciation for the "divisive political potential" of
"programs of aid to sectarian schools" required that Allen be overruled. See id. at 259 ("Allen did not
consider the significance of the potential for political divisiveness inherent in programs of aid to
sectarian schools.").
177. Id. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As in Meek, Justice Powell's
concern went beyond the division that might naturally attend the appropriations process. He sounded a
broader alarm, about "denominational control."
178. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 n.14 (1988) ("We also disagree with the
District Court's conclusion that the (Act] is invalid because it is likely to create political division along
religious lines. It may well be that because of the importance of the issues relating to adolescent
sexuality there may be a division of opinion along religious lines as well as other lines. But the same
may be said of a great number of other public issues of our day." (citation omitted)); Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 661 n.8 (1980) ("We find no merit whatever in
appellants' argument.., that the extent of entanglement here is sufficient to raise the danger of future
political divisiveness along religious lines."); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765-66
(1976) (endorsing, as "entirely sound," the conclusion that the aid program in question was constitu-
tional-and not excessively divisive-because, inter alia, of the "substantial autonomy of the colleges"
receiving the aid). See generally, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, at 1195-97 (describing these
developments).
179. 473 U.S. 373 (1985)
180. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Both the Ball and Aguilar decisions have, of course, been overruled. See
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
181. 473 U.S. at 398. The Court also describes the program and the "sectarian" character of many of
the schools at which the programs operated. See id. at 375-79.
182. See id. at 397 n.14. The trial court had concluded, though, that the programs in question
"entailed an unacceptable level of entanglement, both political and administrative, between the public
school systems and the sectarian schools." Id. at 380-81. In several of the briefs filed in the case,
though, the Argument was invoked or engaged. See, e.g., Brief of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26, Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990), 1984 WL 565398 (warning that judicial approval of "schemes" like the
one at issue in Ball "would create divisiveness along religious lines the likes of which this country has
not seen. The current anti-clericalism would be multiplied many fold"); Brief of the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 24, Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990), 1984 WL 565395
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nan's cautionary observation that "just as religion throughout history has provided
spiritual comfort, guidance, and inspiration to many, it can also serve power-
fully to divide societies,"' 8 3 and also his defense of the Lemon test in school-aid
cases on the ground that "[t]he government's activities in this area can have a
magnified impact on impressionable young minds, and the occasional rivalry of
parallel public and private school systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity
for divisive rifts along religious lines in the body politic.
184
In Ball's companion case, Aguilar v. Felton, the Justices similarly invalidated
a New York City program that used federal funds to pay the salaries of
public-school employees who taught nonreligious, remedial subjects on-site in
parochial schools. 185 As in Lemon, the Court concluded that government supervi-
sion designed to make sure that the content of publicly funded education
remained entirely non-religious "inevitably results in the excessive entangle-
ment of church and state."1 8 6 In other words, New York's effort to prevent its
policy from having the effect of advancing religion brought it into conflict with
the no-entanglement rule. 187 Justice Brennan also observed, without dwelling
on the matter, that the required monitoring of religious schools' activities could
increase "the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines.' 88 How-
ever, the primary dangers associated with this monitoring were not so much the
risks of political discord associated with efforts to implement Title I, but the
interference and "secularization" that it posed to religion."s9 The Argument
played a more prominent role in the concurring-and crucial-opinion of
Justice Powell. Acknowledging that the programs in both Ball and Aguilar had
(noting that it is "difficult to know which side in a religiously-related dispute should prevail when a
court determines that the political divisiveness of the controversy is too great to permit resolution by
elected officials").
183. Ball, 473 U.S. at 382. The way through this tension-a solution which Justice Brennan
attributes to the Founders-is the privatization of religion. See id. at 382 ("The solution to this problem
adopted by the Framers and consistently recognized by this Court is jealously to guard the right of
every individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience while requiring the government to
maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and nonreligion.").
184. Id. at 383.
185. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404. The Court also noted that the funds were used to pay for the teaching
of "remedial reading, reading skills, remedial mathematics, [and] English as a second language" to Title
I's low-income beneficiaries. Id. at 406.
186. See id. at 409. As in Lemon, this conclusion depended crucially on the Court's characterization
of the parochial schools at issue as "pervasively sectarian," and therefore in need of careful monitoring
to prevent the funding of religious activities. Id. at 411-13.
187. Put differently, the Establishment Clause simultaneously requires and forbids the careful
supervision and monitoring of publicly funded teachers in parochial schools. See id. at 420-21
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)) (referring to "Catch-22 paradox").
188. Id. at 414 (majority opinion).
189. See id. at 413 (noting the Establishment Clause's objective of "prevent[ing] intrusion of either
[church or state] into the precincts of the other' (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)));
id. at 414 (" ' [T]he picture of state inspectors prowling the halls of parochial schools... surely raises
more than an imagined specter of governmental "secularization of a creed."' (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 650 (opinion of Brennan, J.))).
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"'done so much good and little, if any, detectable harm,"' 1 90 he nonetheless
emphasized the "considerable risk of continuing political strife over the propri-
ety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper allocation of limited
governmental resources."'
19 1
Justice Powell's separate opinion is noteworthy for being more specific about
what, exactly, the harm is that triggers the Argument: The fear is not, he
confessed, that the government funding could result in the "establishment of a
state religion"; nor is it even that local efforts to implement the program could
''result in significant religious or denominational control over our democratic
processes."' 192 Instead, the point is that the enactment and implementation of the
program take place in a political context and will certainly "spark political
disagreement." 193 The "proper allocation of limited government resources" is,
necessarily, a contentious subject, and so programs like these pose a "consider-
able risk of continuing political strife."' 94 What's more, he reasoned, even a
healthy political community-one that is generally able to weather the storms of
division and disagreement-is endangered by the kind of "strife" that is associ-
ated with public assistance to parochial-school students.1 95 The "potential for
such divisiveness" provided, for Justice Powell, "a strong additional reason" for
invalidating the programs at issue.
196
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, remained unhappy with the uses to which his
opinion in Lemon-in particular, his discussion of "political divisiveness along
religious lines"-was being put by his colleagues. 197 It was Justice O'Connor,
though, who responded most directly to Justice Powell's invocation of the
potential for division. In her view, neither in Meek nor in Aguilar had the parties
presented convincing evidence that publicly funded instruction in parochial
190. Id. at 415 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Felton v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 72 (2d
Cir. 1984)).
191. Id. at 416.
192. Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)); cf Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796
(1973) ("[W]hat is at stake ... is preventing that kind and degree of governmental involvement in
religious life that... frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.").
193. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 417 (Powell, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 416 (stating that there will, unavoidably, be "competition and strife," and that it will,
unavoidably, be the case that "politics will enter into any state decision to aid parochial schools").
195. See id. at 417 ("[A]id to parochial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to 'that kind
and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife
and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point."' (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.,
397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))). Justice Powell's opinion here raises the question
whether the "involvement" at issue here-the involvement that triggers the objectionable strife-is the
monitoring or the funding itself.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. See id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (expressing "concern that the Court's obsession with
the criteria identified in [Lemon] has led to results that are 'contrary to the long-range interests of the
country'); see also id. at 421 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Court had "traveled far
afield from the concerns which prompted the adoption of the First Amendment when we rely on
gossamer abstractions to invalidate a law which obviously meets an entirely secular need").
2006] 1697
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
schools "would produce political divisiveness."' 98 The weakness in the division-
based argument was not simply a matter of the weight of the evidence. Justice
O'Connor also questioned the very idea of according constitutional significance
to predictions of political disagreement, 99 highlighting the "hecker's veto"
character of the Argument. z° °
D. VARIATIONS ON THE ARGUMENT IN OTHER CONTEXTS
The possibility of "political divisiveness along religious lines" was invoked
and treated as having doctrinal significance not only in school-funding cases.2 0 '
That said, by the mid-1980s, a majority of the Justices agreed with Justice
O'Connor that "the 'elusive inquiry' into political divisiveness should be con-
fined to the narrow category of parochial-aid cases. 20 2 As if to confirm its
198. Id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 429 ("The Court's reliance on the potential
for political divisiveness as evidence of undue entanglement is also unpersuasive. There is little record
support for the proposition that [the program] has ignited any controversy other than this litigation.").
199. Id. at 429. Justice O'Connor also noted that in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the
"concurring opinion... suggest[ed] that Establishment Clause analysis should focus solely on the
character of the government activity that might cause political divisiveness" and that "'the entangle-
ment prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entanglement."' Aguilar, 473 U.S. at
429 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687).
200. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 429 ("It is curious indeed to base our interpretation of the Constitution on
speculation as to the likelihood of a phenomenon which the parties may create merely by prosecuting a
lawsuit.").
201. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (invalidating a Massachusetts
zoning statute that prohibited the granting of a liquor license to an establishment located within 500 feet
of a church if the church objected, noting that, by vesting an effective "veto" with religious institutions,
the statute "enmeshes churches in the processes of government," and created the danger of political
divisiveness along religious lines and therefore failed the Lemon test); cf McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 629-30 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that Tennessee law prohibiting
ministers from serving at a constitutional convention was unconstitutional, and emphasizing that it was
impermissible to assume that ministers elected to public office "will necessarily exercise their powers
and influence to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the interests of another, thus pitting one
against the others, contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its command of neutrality").
202. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,
825 (2000) (plurality opinion) (upholding federal law authorizing loan of educational equipment to
schools, including private and religious schools, and rejecting any "resurrect[ion]" of the political-
divisiveness inquiry, which was "rightly disregarded" after Aguilar); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
617 n.14 (1988) (upholding Adolescent Family Life Act, which provided grants to religious and other
institutions providing counseling on teenage sexuality, and stating that "the question of 'political
divisiveness' should be regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to
parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools." (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
403 n.ll (1983))); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 n.17 (1987) ("'[T]his
Court has not held that political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible
conduct. And we decline to so hold today. This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-
sponsored schools or colleges, or other religious institutions, and hence no inquiry into political
divisiveness is even called for..."' (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684)); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403 n. 11
(1983) (upholding a Minnesota provision that permitted taxpayers to deduct educational expenses from
their state income-tax returns, whether those expenses were associated with public or private schooling,
and stating that Lemon's "political divisiveness" language should be "confined to cases where direct
financial subsidies are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools."). In neither Bowen
nor Mueller was it explained what it was about the political-divisiveness argument, or the arguments
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"elusive" nature, though, the Argument resisted confinement. Although the
Court has put aside Chief Justice Burger's formulation-that is, the potential for
"political divisiveness along religious lines" is a kind of "excessive entangle-
ment" within the meaning of the Lemon test's third part2 03-the Argument has
nonetheless continued to be employed in a wide variety of cases and in many
different ways. It has proved versatile and protean; its premises and the con-
cerns to which it speaks are hardy and easily transplantable.
For example, one encounters these same premises and concerns throughout
the Court's flirtation with, and embracing of, Justice O'Connor's "endorsement
test.' '204 In Lynch v. Donnelly,205 the Justices considered a challenge to Paw-
tucket, Rhode Island's annual Christmas display, which included a creche. Chief
Justice Burger downplayed the significance of the Lemon test,20 6 and of the
political-divisiveness inquiry,20 7 focusing instead on the history of religious
displays and expression in American public life.20 8 In a concurring opinion,
though, Justice O'Connor set out her views concerning the importance in
Establishment Clause cases of preventing government "endorsement" of reli-
20gion. ° In so doing, she stated that the presence or absence of political
pressed in Lemon, that justified such a limitation. See, e.g., Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson
County, 407 F.3d 266, 273 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that "[t]he Court's 'political divisiveness' rubric
is... inapplicable" to cases outside the parochial-school-funding context).
To be sure, the cabining or confining of the argument from division has not been without exceptions.
See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800-01, 805 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (insisting that
"any group of law students" would, employing Lemon, invalidate Nebraska's practice of allowing a
paid chaplain to open legislative sessions with a prayer and arguing that the Establishment Clause
seeks, "with regard to matters that are essentially religious... that there should be no political battles").
203. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1997) (restructuring the Lemon test and
rejecting the idea that "administrative cooperation" and "political divisiveness" represent independent
bases for invalidating state actions).
Claims about division have also been pressed in cases that turned on another of Lemon's prongs. In
Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987), for example, the Court invalidated-as lacking the
required "secular purpose"-Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
Science in Public School Instruction Act." Dissenting from this disposition, Justice Scalia offered the
reminder that "political activism by the religiously motivated is a part of our heritage" and that
"[tioday's religious activism may give us the Balanced Treatment Act, but yesterday's resulted in the
abolition of slavery, and tomorrow's may bring relief for famine victims." Id. at 615 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
204. Cf Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 31, at 953-54 (concluding that the Argument has "kept a small
toehold" in the area of Establishment Clause challenges to government speech on religious issues).
205. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
206. Id. at 679 ("We have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test
in this sensitive area.").
207. Id. at 684 ("[T]his Court has not held that political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate
otherwise permissible conduct.").
208. Id. at 675 ("Our history is replete with official references to the value and invocation of Divine
guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders."); id.
at 680 (noting City's display need not be considered an unconstitutional endorsement of religion, but
instead a depiction of a "significant historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World").
209. See id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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divisiveness "should not be an independent test of constitutionality., 2 °10 In fact,
though, the exposition and application of Justice O'Connor's "endorsement
test" has in practice invariably involved something like the search for political
divisiveness along religious lines. That is, asking whether a reasonable observer
would regard herself as having been cast by state action as an outsider in the
political community seems consonant with, if not equivalent to, asking whether
that same state action does or could cause political divisiveness. 21  For ex-
ample, in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Justice
O'Connor evaluated the holiday displays at issue in terms of the messages of
exclusion or favoritism that were or were not communicated by government.
21 2
As Justice Stevens reminded her, though, the question whether religious minori-
ties or outsiders perceive such exclusion or favoritism is not easily separable
from observations and predictions about religion-based divisions in the political
community.213 More recently, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,
a majority of the Justices concluded that principles of standing counseled
against resolving definitively constitutional questions surrounding the recitation
of the Pledge of Allegiance in public-school classrooms.214 Justice O'Connor,
though, would have reached the merits and approved the Pledge. She found it
both telling and constitutionally relevant, in her concurring opinion, that "so
little ire has been directed at the Pledge. 21 5
Justice Kennedy's focus on coercion in Establishment Clause cases is also
hospitable to a revised or translated form of the Argument. 216 This method's
210. Id. at 689 ("[W]e have never relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for holding a
governmental practice unconstitutional."); cf. id. at 703 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he quiescence of
those opposed to the creche may have reflected nothing more than their sense of futility in opposing the
majority.").
211. See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (framing inquiry in terms of whether government
makes religion relevant to one's "standing in the political community").
212. See 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If government is to be neutral in
matters of religion, rather than showing either favoritism or disapproval towards citizens based on their
personal religious choices, government cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some
citizens without sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full
members of the political community.").
213. See id. at 651 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("These cases
illustrate the danger that governmental displays of religious symbols may give rise to unintended
divisiveness, for the net result of the Court's disposition is to disallow the display of the creche but to
allow the display of the menorah.").
Judge McConnell has criticized the endorsement test for precisely these reasons. In his view, the
problem with the endorsement approach "is that it exacerbates religious division and discord by
heightening the sense of grievance over symbolic injuries." Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom
ata Crossroads, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 115, 193 (1992).
214. See 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004).
215. Id. at 39 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also cited the observation, made in
Lynch, that the display in question there had "caused no political divisiveness." See id. at 38 (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984)). The question of the Pledge's "divisiveness" was
also, as has already been noted, a topic on which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Newdow exchanged
views during oral argument. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
216. This notwithstanding the fact that the "coercion" test is framed and regarded as departing in
significant and important ways from the concerns animating the "endorsement" test. Compare Alle-
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most prominent deployment was in Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court invali-
dated a nonsectarian prayer offered by an invited rabbi at a middle-school
graduation.21 7 Writing for a narrow majority, Justice Kennedy purported to
reject an invitation to reconsider Lemon;21 8 still, his analysis owed little to that
case's three-part test. Instead, it was enough to establish-or, in any event, to
conclude-that the relevant state actors had "creat[ed] a state-sponsored and
state-directed religious exercise in a public school., 2 19 Certainly, Justice
Kennedy's core claim was that "[no holding by this Court suggests that a
school can persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious exercise";
indeed, he insisted, such compulsion is forbidden by the Establishment Clause.22°
Nonetheless, the decision owes as much as any post-Lemon opinion to claims
and predictions about politics, division, and religion. At times, the Argument is
explicit; 221 in other places, its work is more subtle. 222 Although Justice Kennedy
took pains to disavow any sweeping "no division" mandate 223 and to locate his
argument in a particular context-one that, in his view, presents special dangers
of coercion-premises about "political divisiveness" run through Justice
Kennedy's typically high-flying rhetoric about the nature and purpose of school-
ing in a "pluralistic society.,
224
gheny, 492 U.S. at 627-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the "coercion" test, as opposed to the
"endorsement" test, "fails to take account of the numerous more subtle ways that government can show
favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to others"), with id. at 668-79
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the "endorsement" test is
unworkable in practice, and requires the Court to "act as a censor, issuing national decrees as to what is
orthodox and what is not").
217. See 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) ("The question before us is whether including clerical members
who offer prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony is consistent with the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment .....
218. See id. at 587.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 599.
221. See, e.g., id. at 587 ("The reason for the choice of a rabbi is not disclosed by the record, but the
potential for divisiveness over the choice of a particular member of the clergy to conduct the ceremony
is apparent.").
222. See, e.g., id. at 597-98 ("We know too that sometimes to endure social isolation or even anger
may be the price of conscience or nonconformity. But, by any reading of our cases, the conformity
required by the student in this case was too high an exaction to withstand the test of the Establishment
Clause."); id. at 596 ("To say that a student must remain apart from the ceremony at the opening
invocation and closing benediction is to risk compelling conformity in an environment analogous to the
classroom setting, where we have said the risk of compulsion is especially high."). The Argument's
work here is "subtle" in the sense that Justice Kennedy is concerned that the cost to a student of
protecting her conscience or of avoiding pressures to conform is that she "must remain apart from the
ceremony"-that she must, in a sense, be divided and separated from the community by government-
sponsored religious activity.
223. See, e.g., id. at 587-88 ("Divisiveness, of course, can attend any state decision respecting
religions, and neither its existence nor its potential necessarily invalidates the State's attempts to
accommodate religion in all cases."); id. at 597 ("We do not hold that every state action implicating
religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive.").
224. See, e.g., id. at 590-91 ("To endure the speech of false ideas or offensive content and then to
counter it is part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open
discourse toward the end of a tolerant citizenry. And tolerance presupposes some mutuality of
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Eventually, Justice Kennedy pulled back to more modest claims about the
perceptions of the "nonbeliever or the dissenter" in the setting of a public-
school graduation. 225 And, in the end, the case probably turned more on "peer
pressure" than on political fissures.226 It remained for Justice Blackmun to pick
up and run with the argument from division. To underscore his insistence that
"it is not enough that the government restrain from compelling religious prac-
tices,, 227 Justice Blackmun stated that "[t]he mixing of government and religion
can be a threat to free government, even if no one is forced to participate"
because "[o]nly 'anguish, hardship and bitter strife' result 'when zealous reli-
gious groups struggl[e] with one another to obtain the government's stamp of
approval."'228 Echoing the worry that Justice Powell often expressed in the
parochial-school-aid cases, Justice Blackmun warned that "[s]uch a struggle can
'strain a political system to the breaking point."'' 229 He supplemented these
claims about strife with a quotation from the Memorial and Remonstrance, by
invoking the specter of the Inquisition, and with an anecdote supplied by a
lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union concerning the volatility of the
school-prayer issue. 230 Not far below the surface was the charge that religion,
obligation .... Against this background, students may consider it an odd measure of justice to be
subjected during the course of their educations to ideas deemed offensive and irreligious, but to be
denied a brief, formal prayer ceremony that the school offers in return.").
225. See id. at 592. This reliance on "perceptions" might come as a surprise, given that the
"coercion" test is offered as, among other things, an alternative to the "endorsement" test.
226. See id. at 593-96; cf. id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's test of
"psychological coercion" as "its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its social engineering... a
boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion").
Another, more recent, school-prayer case also connects the "no coercion" rule with concerns about
"divisiveness." In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), the Court
reviewed a Texas public high school's practice of electing a student council chaplain to lead public
prayer before home football games. The Court disapproved the practice, stating among other things that
"the realities of the situation plainly reveal ... both perceived and actual endorsement of religion." Id.
at 305. In addition, though, the majority offered as a justification for embracing a facial challenge to the
policy the belief that the election system "encourages divisiveness along religious lines and threatens
the imposition of coercion upon those students not desiring to participate in a religious exercise." Id. at
317; see also id. at 311 ("The mechanism encourages divisiveness along religious lines in a public
school setting, a result at odds with the Establishment Clause."). It is worth noting that while Justices
had expressed in the earlier school-aid cases a fear that state action concerning schools would cause
political division along religious lines, here the focus has shifted to "divisiveness along religious lines"
in the "public school setting." Id.
227. Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 606-07 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962)).
229. Id. at 607 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970)). In his separate
opinion, Justice Souter hinted at a similar theme. See id. at 617-18 (Souter, J., concurring) ("We have
not changed much since the days of Madison, and the judiciary should not willingly enter the political
arena to battle the centripetal force leading from religious pluralism to official preference for the faith
with the most votes.").
230. See id. at 607 & n.10 ("Religion has not lost its power to engender divisiveness."). Justice
Blackmun quoted the lawyer's report that "[o]f all the issues the ACLU takes on... [a]side from our
efforts to abolish the death penalty, [school prayer] is the only issue that elicits death threats." Id. To
this claim, Justice Scalia responded in dissent: "The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome
potential of sectarian religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil strife. And they also knew
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because it is divisive, is dangerous to democracy.2 31
Perhaps the most difficult of the Court's recent Establishment Clause cases to
categorize, or to assimilate to the current doctrinal structure, is Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet.2 32 New York had
created a school district by special statute specifically for the Village of Kiryas
Joel, "a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim., 2 33 Justice Souter, writing for the
Court, saw the statute as "tantamount to an allocation of political power on a
religious criterion" and, therefore, as a violation of the Establishment Clause.234
If only out of habit, Justice Souter added that, in Lemon's terms, this unlawful
"allocation of power" had the impermissible effect of advancing religion. 235 But
that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a
toleration-no, an affection-for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God
whom they all worship and seek." Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. See id. at 607 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Democracy requires the nourishment of dialog and
dissent, while religious faith puts its trust in an ultimate divine authority above all human deliberation.
When the government appropriates religious truth, it 'transforms rational debate into theological
decree.' Those who disagree no longer are questioning the policy judgment of the elected but the rules
of a higher authority who is beyond reproach."); id. at 608 ("Democratic government will not last long
when proclamation replaces persuasion as the medium of political exchange."). In other words, the
influence of "religion" is divisive because religion is unreasoning. Democracy must be policed so as to
remain the realm of "persuasion." See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Clarence Darrow's claim that "[t]he realm of
religion.., is where knowledge leaves off, and where faith begins").
In his separate opinion, Justice Souter hinted at a similar theme. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 617-18 ("We
have not changed much since the days of Madison, and the judiciary should not willingly enter the
political arena to battle the centripetal force leading from religious pluralism to official preference for
the faith with the most votes.").
232. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
233. Id. at 690. Governor Cuomo remarked, when he signed the bill creating the district, that it was
"'a good faith effort to solve th[e] unique problem' associated with providing special education services
to handicapped children in the village." Id. at 693.
234. See id. at 690; see also id. at 696 (stating that the law creating the school district "departs from
[the First Amendment's 'neutrality' command] by delegating the State's discretionary authority over
public schools to a group defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal and historical
context that gives no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised neutrally."); id.
at 696-708 (analyzing the district in light of Larkin). But see id. at 746 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Justice Souter's reading of Larkin).
It was only the school district, and not the Village itself-even though the district followed the
Village's lines-that was invalidated. And, the "boundaries of the village of Kiryas Joel were drawn to
include just the 320 acres owned and inhabited entirely by Satmars." Id. at 691. Note also that the
impetus for the creation of the school district was the Court's decisions in Aguilar and Ball, which cast
doubt on the validity of earlier efforts to provide special-education services to Satmar children
attending religious schools. See id. at 692; id. at 730-31 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 697. Justice Blackmun wrote separately to "note my disagreement with any suggestion
that today's decision signals a departure from the principles described in [Lemon]." Id. at 710
(Blackmun, J., concurring). He also insisted that the Court's analysis was functionally similar to an
application of Lemon's "effect" and "entanglement" prongs. See id. at 710. Justice O'Connor, however,
welcomed the Court's lack of emphasis on Lemon. See id. at 718 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("[S]etting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases may sometimes do
more harm than good."); id. at 721 ("[T]he case law will better be able to evolve towards [a unified test]
if it is freed from the Lemon test's rigid influence."); see also id. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring
to the Court's "snub of Lemon").
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even if Lemon and its three-part test were cast in a background role, the
Argument was on display. Even in setting the stage and reciting the facts,
Justice Souter reported that "[n]eighbors who did not wish to secede with the
Satmars objected strenuously" to the Village's creation.236 At the heart of his
analysis was unease about "legislative favoritism along religious lines ' '237 and
the concern, if not the conviction, that the "next similarly situated group seeking
a school district of its own [would not] receive one."238
The dangers of political division and social segregation were also flagged in
several of the Justices' separate opinions. Justice Stevens, for example, couched
his arguments not so much in terms of the strife that might attend the legislative
creation of school districts like the one for Kiryas Joel, but rather in terms of the
sectarianism and separation that would result from such an accommodation.239
Thus, what the district's supporters regarded as a program aimed at assisting, in
a religion-sensitive way, certain special-needs children,24 Justice Stevens char-
acterized as an attempt to accommodate a "religious sect's interest in segregat-
ing itself and preventing its children from associating with their neighbors."24'
For him, it was not only a social and civic flaw, but also a constitutional one, in
the district's creation that it "increased the likelihood that [Satmar children]
would remain within the fold.",2 42 As in some of the Court's earlier school-aid
cases, then, the controlling concern in Justice Stevens's opinion was not so
much with the division surrounding a decision to fund education in religious
schools, but instead with the division created by religious education itself.
Taking a different tack, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the legislature had
exploited "political or electoral boundaries" in crafting what could otherwise
stand as a commendable accommodation of religion.243 That is, it was the
conflation of political and religious lines-a conflation that presented "the
danger of stigma and stirred animosities"-and not speculation concerning the
outcome of future legislative battles, that troubled him.
236. Id. at 691 (majority opinion).
237. Id. at 704.
238. Id. at 703. But see id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ('This rationale seems to me without
grounding in our precedents and a needless restriction upon the legislature's ability to respond to the
unique problems of a particular religious group."); id. at 726 ( "No party has adduced any evidence that
the legislature has denied another religious community like the Satmars its own school district under
analogous circumstances.").
239. See id. at 711-12 (Stevens, J., concurring)
240. Cf id. at 716 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the law creating the district "singles out a
particular religious group for favorable treatment" and was not a "general accommodation").
241. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring). But see id. at 749 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Justice Stevens'
statement is less a legal analysis than a manifesto of secularism. It surpasses mere rejection of
accommodation, and announces a positive hostility to religion-which, unlike all other noncriminal
values, the State must not assist parents in transmitting to their children.").
242. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the law as one that "provided official support to
cement the attachment of young adherents to a particular faith").
243. See id. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireli-
gious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together become
separatist; antagonisms that related to race or to religion rather than to
political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative
but the best racial or religious partisan. Since that system is at war with the
democratic ideal, it should find no footing here.
2 4 4
To be sure, Justice Kennedy insisted that he was not confusing the "democratic
ideal" with assimilation or cultural homogeneity:
[T]he Establishment Clause must not be construed as some sort of homogeniz-
ing solvent that forces unconventional religious groups to choose between
assimilating to mainstream American culture or losing their political rights.
There is more than a fine line, however, between the voluntary association
that leads to a political community comprised of people who share a common
religious faith, and the forced separation that occurs when the government
draws explicit political boundaries on the basis of peoples' faith.24 5
E. THE REVIVAL OF THE POLITICAL-DIVISIVENESS ARGUMENT
Since Lemon, the argument that "political divisiveness along religious lines"
is a phenomenon that judges are authorized and competent to identify and that is
relevant to the constitutionality of government action has been employed in
dozens of cases by dozens of courts.2 4 6 The Argument's purchase, again,
appears to have revived somewhat in recent years, providing the structure and
animating theme for Justice Breyer's dissent in Zelman, and also a powerful
rhetorical flourish for Michael Newdow in his oral arguments.2 47 During those
arguments, Justice Breyer opened the door, suggesting to Newdow that the
Pledge of Allegiance "isn't that divisive if... you have a very broad understand-
ing of God," and that, perhaps, the Pledge "serves a purpose of unification at the
244. Id. at 728-29 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting));
see also id. (noting that a "fundamental limitation" imposed by the Establishment Clause is that
"government may not use religion as a criterion to draw political or electoral lines"); id. ("[T]he
Establishment Clause forbids the government to use religion as a line-drawing criterion."); id. at 732
("The Establishment Clause forbids the government to draw political boundaries on the basis of
religious faith."). For Justice Kennedy, the "lines" or divisions in question have the advantage of being
more concrete than those presumed or invoked by, say, Chief Justice Burger in Lemon. Note the tension
between this proclamation and Justice Kennedy's observation that "[p]eople who share a common
religious belief or lifestyle may live together without sacrificing the basic rights of self-governance that
all American citizens enjoy[.]" Id. at 730.
245. id. at 730 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
246. For only a few of many, see, for example, Am. Family Ass'n, Inc., v. City of San Francisco, 277
F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2001);
Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc., 224 F3d 283 (4th Cir. 2000); ACLU of New
Jersey ex rel. Lander v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3d. Cir. 1999).
247. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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price of offending a small number of people like you."248 Newdow, not surpris-
ingly, resisted this proposed constitutionalization of the "law disregards trifles"
maxim, 49 insisting that "there's [nothing] in the Constitution that says what
percentage of people get separated out.
' 250
Most recently, Justice Breyer's conclusions about the division caused, or not
caused, by Ten Commandments displays in Texas and Kentucky were outcome-
determinative last Term in Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU.
251
Speaking through ten separate opinions,252 the Justices disapproved, for lacking
a "secular purpose," displays in two Kentucky county courthouses.2 53 At the
same time, they permitted a six-foot-high stone monolith, inscribed with the
Commandments, on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol. 254 Although Justice
Souter's opinion for the Court in McCreary focused on the secular-purpose
question, he tied that inquiry and its importance to claims about "divisiveness"
and conflict. He noted, for example, that for government to act with a prohibited
religious "purpose" would "clash[] with the 'understanding reached... after
decades of war, that liberty and social stability demand a religious tolerance that
respects the religious views of all citizens."' 2 55 He also warned of the "civic
divisiveness that follows when the Government weighs in on one side of
religious debate., 256 "Nothing," after all, "does a better job of roiling soci-
ety.",2 57 Justice O'Connor sounded similar themes in her concurring opinion.
She pronounced us "fortunate" that "[o]ur regard for constitutional boundaries"
between religion and government has "protected us" from the "violent conse-
quences of the assumption of religious authority by government.
' 258
In the Van Orden case, Chief Justice Rehnquist had nothing to say specifi-
cally about the divisiveness, or lack of it, associated with the Texas monument.
248. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 43.
249. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 3533 (West 2004). See generally Jeff Nemerofsky, What Is a
"Trifle" Anyway?, 37 Go.z. L. REv. 315 (2001-2002).
250. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 43.
251. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment);
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, JJ.)
252. According to a news report, the number of separate opinions in Van Orden and McCreary
County prompted Chief Justice Rehnquist to quip, "I didn't know we had that many people on our
Court." See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow a Commandments Display, Bar Others, N.Y. 'Thas, June
28, 2005, at A6.
253. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2722.
254. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2854; see also id. at 2864 ("The inclusion of the Ten Command-
ments monument in this group [of monuments on the Capitol grounds] has a dual significance,
partaking of both religion and government.").
255. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2733 (quoting Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002))
256. Id. at 2742.
257. Id.; see also id. at 2745 ("We are centuries away from the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre and
the treatment of heretics in early Massachusetts, but the divisiveness of religion in current public life is
inescapable.").
258. Id. at 2746 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2747 ("Allowing government to be a
potential mouthpiece for competing religious ideas risk the sort of division that might easily spill over
into suppression of rival beliefs.").
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But again, Justice Breyer-whose departure from the McCreary majority sup-
plied the deciding vote--certainly did. He highlighted as a "basic purpose[]" of
the Establishment Clause to "avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that
promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion
alike. ' 259 He several times disclaimed any reliance on a "single mechanical
formula" 26° and concluded that the monument is not constitutionally impermis-
sible because it is "unlikely to prove divisive., 261 Indeed, Justice Breyer
invoked the possibility of "religiously based divisiveness" resulting from a
contrary ruling as an additional reason for permitting the monument.2 62 That is,
his predictions about political divisiveness along religious lines resulting from
state action served not as such predictions usually have-i.e., as a reason for
invalidating the action being challenged as an unconstitutional establishment of
religion-but instead as a reason for staying the Court's hand.2 63 At the same
time, Justice Breyer emphasized that the monument's forty-year, controversy-
free history provided a reason to conclude that its message was not being
perceived as religious or exclusionary.26
The foregoing account shows that the Argument has been put to a variety of
uses and has taken many forms. If courts have been neither clear nor consistent
with respect to the role that political divisiveness plays in resolving Establish-
ment Clause disputes,265 they have done no better when it comes to pinning
259. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring); cf, e.g., Lemon, 413 U.S. at 622 ('The
potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political process.").
260. Id.; see also id. at 2869 ("I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.").
261. Id. at 2871. For Justice Breyer, this conclusion was supported by the fact that "[t]his display has
stood apparently uncontested for nearly two generations." Id. Justice Breyer's conclusion that the Texas
monument was not so divisive as to require invalidation prompted Justice Souter to quip, "I doubt that a
slow walk to the courthouse, even one that took 40 years, is much evidentiary help in applying the
Establishment Clause." Id. at 2897 (Souter, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring).
263. Cf, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 341 F.3d 312, 324 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) ('There is a danger that in overturning long and widely accepted
accommodations, courts will divide a community, rather than unite it. A primary aim of the Establish-
ment Clause is to prevent divisiveness over matters of religion."); Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1238, 1240 (D. Utah 2001) (rejecting argument that City violated the
First Amendment by selling a pedestrian easement in the Main Street Plaza to the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints, noting that the City's desire to "bring[] an end to the divisiveness in the
community" and "put[ting] to rest an extremely divisive issue" were valid "secular purposes").
264. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("This display has stood apparently
uncontested for nearly two generations. That experience helps us understand that as a practical matter
of degree this display is unlikely to prove divisive.").
265. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, at 1193 (noting that the Argument has done very little
real "work," but has instead served only "to reinforce the conclusions of the Court"). In similar fashion,
Professor Tribe noted that although "the Court has not yet delineated this inquiry's independent power,"
it has "emphasized divisiveness as a factor in striking down various programs, particularly aid to
parochial schools." LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-14, at 1278 (1988). What's
more, "the Court has specifically declined to hold that the threat of divisiveness is alone sufficient to
strike a program down." Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) ("The Court of
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down the phenomenon itself: Sometimes, the "divisiveness" doing the job
seems to refer to the fact that members of the political community will argue
about, and line up on different sides of, legislative proposals-particularly
proposals that involve the allocation of public funds. This "dividing of the
house" is thought to be particularly pernicious when the resulting fault lines
appear to track religious or denominational lines. In some opinions, though, the
division that is treated as constitutionally significant, and troubling, has less to
do with election-day tallies than with tone of public discourse, the texture of
civil society, and the dispositions of citizens, schoolchildren in particular. In still
others, the use of the Establishment Clause by judges as a way to monitor and
curb "political divisiveness along religious lines" seems to reflect a determina-
tion that certain results are substantively undesirable, and therefore impermis-
sible.26 6
Because "political divisiveness along religious lines" has meant and can
mean so many different things, and observations or predictions about it can be
put to a variety of doctrinal uses, it is difficult to respond, both to the Argument
itself and to its application in particular cases. It is hard to engage an argument
that will not stand still.
III. VARIATIONS ON A THEME
Again, it is not always clear in the relevant cases what is the alleged
connection between the existence or prediction of political disagreement; the
"religious" nature of the subject matter about which people disagree; the
"religious" beliefs or affiliations of those people who are doing the disagreeing;
and the test, history, structure, and purpose of the Establishment Clause. None-
theless, it is fair to say that, in the years since Lemon, there has waxed and
waned in Establishment Clause cases an Argument that involves a complicated
combination of claims about the effects of certain policies or legislative propos-
als on the tone and content of public discourse, about the connection between
such effects and religious affiliations and belief, about the history and purpose
of the First Amendment, about the role of courts, and about principles and
norms of political morality.
In this Part, I take up the merits of the Argument. The aim here is to examine
and determine exactly what it is that those who assert or presume a working
doctrinal relationship between constitutional validity, on the one hand, and
"division" or "strife," on the other, are claiming. What, in other words, is the
"political divisiveness" argument? Perhaps, in the end, a pat answer is not
available. Still, the effort is worthwhile, as it helps us to assess the normative
Appeals correctly observed that this Court has not held that political divisiveness alone can serve to
invalidate otherwise permissible conduct.")).
266. Cf TMUE, supra note 265, at 1278 n.19 ("[T]he Court has suggested that state aid to parochial
schools possesses a uniquely divisive potential."); id. at 1278 ("[Tlhe Court has suggested that the
inquiry applies only in a limited set of cases.").
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attractiveness of its premises and several incarnations.
The Argument's staying power and apparent revival might seem surprising, given
that it has been frequently and strongly criticized and has rarely received an energetic
defense, even by judges who invoke and apply it and scholars who concede sympathy
for it. In what appears to remain, after nearly twenty-five years, the only article-length
treatment of the Argument, Professor Gaffney asserted provocatively that the Court
had inflicted a "wound" on itself by "introduc[ing] into the standards of constitutional
adjudication the dubious proposition that judges are empowered to invalidate legisla-
tion if that legislation might have the tendency to create 'political division along
religious lines."' 267 Similarly---though, perhaps, less aggressively-Professor Tribe
long ago characterized as "troubling" the "suggestion that religion.., be kept away
from politics.,268
The scholarly criticisms of the Argument incorporate a number of similar,
overlapping themes. Professor Tribe, for example, has observed that the Argu-
ment purports to authorize a constitutional standard that is "unusually difficult
to administer., 269 Others have challenged the premise that religious commit-
ments are more divisive, or that divisions along religious lines should be more
troubling, than others.2 7 ° Still others have highlighted the sweeping and quix-
otic nature of the Argument, reminding us that religious conflict and political
disputes are inevitable and will always be with US. 2 7 1 Indeed, as Professors
267. Gaffney, supra note 100, at 206; see also, e.g., GERARD V. BRADLEY, CruRcH-SATE RELATION-
sHips iN AMERCA 4-9 (1987); Ripple, supra note 119, at 1219-24; Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 207-10 (1991).
268. TRIBE, supra note 265, at 1276. Professor Tribe also grouped the "political divisiveness inquiry"
with the Court's "secular purpose" test as two doctrines "suggesting that, when religious believers
arrive at political debates, they must check their beliefs at the door or risk losing their efficacy." Id. at
1277-78.
269. Id. at 1280.
270. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 70, at 40-41 ("[R]eligiously grounded moral discourse is not
necessarily more sectarian than secular moral discourse."); id. at 154-55 n.Il ("American history does
not suggest that debates about religious (theological) issues are invariably more divisive than debates
about political issues."); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibil-
ity of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. AR. Lrr=a ROCK L.J. 555, 563--64 (1998) ("There is nothing about
religious belief and practice in contemporary America that is uniquely disruptive of the social order.");
Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REv.
817, 830 (1984) (describing as "problematic" the "factual assumption" that "religious disputes and
religious people are particularly contentious"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good:
Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1597, 1608 (1997) ("[I]f political peace is
the goal, the religion clauses are not at all well tailored to achieve it. They are radically underinclusive
in the subjects of possible divisiveness that they cover."); Smith, supra note 14, at 1248 (noting the
objection that "religion has been no more generative of conflict in modem America than various other
issues and movements"); cf. Marshall, supra note 24, at 859 n.80 (noting that "religion's unique
relationship to one of humanity's deepest fears suggests that it possesses an inherent volatility that
secular ideologies do not").
271. See, e.g., NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, at 1193 ("If the political divisiveness test is in
fact being used by the majority to ban religious conflict, the attempt would appear to be futile at best.");
TRIBE, supra note 265, at 1281 ("[Slome degree of division is inevitable .... ).
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Nowak and Rotunda have noted, it could be that judicial efforts to impose
tranquility and cohesion exacerbate the conflicts, and sharpen the cleavages,
that the political-divisiveness inquiry purports to police.272 Relatedly, it has
been observed that some efforts to soothe the social irritation of religion-related
strife have the effect-an effect that should be regretted in a democracy
committed to equal-respect and full-political-participation norms-of silencing
or excluding from public deliberation those citizens whose views and values are
connected to, or emerge from, their religious commitments.273
At the same time, there is in much of the relevant commentary a suggestion
that, while misplaced as a matter of constitutional doctrine, the Argument
touches on and points toward some important truths of political morality. Thus,
Professor Tribe frames his critique around an acknowledgement that the Argu-
ment begins from "two valid precepts": First, "it correctly focuses on outsiders'
reactions as importantly measuring establishment clause violations"; and sec-
ond, it "correctly notes that religious cleavages could fragment politics, and that
the first amendment in part reduces this danger., 274 At the same time, he
continues, it does not follow from the fact that the First Amendment, properly
understood, is useful in reducing religion-based strife that the Constitution
authorizes, "requires, or even permits, whatever steps might be needed to
reduce religion-based political divisiveness."27
The question remains: What exactly is the Argument? To answer this ques-
tion, assume a proposed or enacted regulatory, spending, or expressive policy
("the Policy"), and assume also that the Policy's opponents say it is unconstitu-
tional because of its "divisive political potential" or because, more specifically,
of the observed or predicted "political division along religious lines" associated
with it. If pressed, how would an opponent of the Policy articulate precisely her
constitutional objection?
272. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 116, at 1194. See also Berg, supra note 31, at 192 ("Currently,
considerable political and social strife stems from the denial of educational choice .. "); Johnson,
supra note 270, at 830 ("One sure way to encourage conflict.., is to encourage people to think that
what seem to be minor irritations are in reality violations of some sacred principle for which they have
a duty to fight."); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 31, at 954 (suggesting that Justice Breyer's position and
opinion in Zelman is "a cause, not a cure, of social strife"); Smith, supra note 14, at 1248 ("[I]t is not
clear that any particular constitutional provision on this subject is well calculated to eliminate
contention: excluding religion from some area of the public domain can be as controversial as including
it."). Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Van Orden recognized as much. See Van Orden v. Perry,
125 S. Ct. 2854, 2871 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). Cf., e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 115, 192-93 (1992) (criticizing the "endorsement
approach" to Establishment Clause questions because "it exacerbates religious division and discord by
heightening the sense of grievance over symbolic injuries" (emphasis added)).
273. See, e.g., FEL.DMAN, supra note 9, at 222-27; PERRY, supra note 70, at 32-33; PAUL J. WErrHmAN,
RELlION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CIZENSHIP 121-47 (2002).
274. TRIBE, supra note 265, at 1279.
275. Id. (citing judicial criticisms of the inquiry); see also, e.g., Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of
Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 716 (1968) (questioning whether the
state's conceded "interest" in "secular unity" makes maintaining such unity an enforceable "constitu-
tional requirement").
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The Policy is unconstitutional because many people disagree with or about it.
Our imagined objector to the Policy would, almost certainly, have more to
say-and would have to say more-than this.27 6 Neither our Constitution nor
any sane political charter would demand unanimity, or even consensus, as a
prerequisite for legal validity; no reasonable person would expect or desire such
a requirement. Disagreement and discord, standing alone, tell us nothing about
the merits-let alone the constitutionality-of a measure, other than that the
measure has been composed by, and proposed to, human beings.277 "Disagree-
ment on matters of principle is," Professor Jeremy Waldron has underscored,
"not the exception but the rule in politics. ' 2 7 8 Even if one concedes that sharp
disagreements and divisions over public policy are regrettable, it would be a
long way from that concession to the conclusion either that such disagreements
reveal or create constitutional infirmity or that courts are authorized to exercise
the power of judicial review to soothe or remove them.2 79 Professor Schwarz
put it well, nearly forty years ago: "If avoidance of strife were an independent
constitutional value, no legislation could be adopted on any subject which
aroused strong and divided feelings. 2 8 °
All this might seem to go without saying. However, for purposes of this
Article's examination of the argument that political division along religious
lines not only correlates with but also defines and determines unconstitutional
state action, the point is worth emphasizing: We always have disagreed and
always will disagree about and divide over things that matter. As Jeremy
Waldron puts it:
276. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) ("[T]his Court has not held that political
divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct.").
277. Cf., e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 ("Ordinarily political debate and division,
however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of
government .... ); Freund, supra note 97, at 1692 ("[Plolitical debate and division is normally a
wholesome process for reaching viable accommodations .... ").
278. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 15 (1999); see also, e.g., PERRY, supra note 70, at 21
("[W]e are perennially divided about the proper role of religious grounded morality in our politics. This
is due in substantial part, no doubt, to the fact that we are perennial divided in our judgments about a
host of important moral issues-and about a host of connected political issues.").
279. See, e.g., Steven D. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL
L. REv. 9, 40 (2004) ("Religious wars have plagued the world for many centuries.... Nonetheless, it
goes too far to suggest that that a significant purpose of the Establishment Clause is to assure that the
polity is not divided politically along religious lines.") Indeed, there is reason to think that the contrary
is true; that is, that government policies and state action motivated by a dislike for disagreement are, for
that reason, suspect. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 n.9 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(insisting that "[tihe Constitution... does not share appellants' alarm at the asserted tendency of
partisan gerrymandering" to produce "hard-core Democrats" rather than "wishy-washy Democrats");
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000) (noting the "inadmissibility" of an
alleged state interest in "producing nominees and nominee positions other than those the [political]
parties would choose if left to their own devices"); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995) (rejecting asserted state interest in "requir[ing]
speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to
alter it with messages of their own").
280. Schwarz, supra note 275, at 711.
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There are many of us, and we disagree about justice. That is, we not only
disagree about the existence of God and the meaning of life; we disagree also
about what count as fair terms of co-operation among people who disagree
about the existence of God and the meaning of life.
281
From the outset, then, we should put on those who would calibrate a measure's
constitutionality to the consensus surrounding it the heavy burden of explaining
how political divisiveness along religious lines is so different from an unremark-
able and unavoidable fact of real persons' political lives that it authorizes
invalidation by reviewing judges of democratically enacted measures.
The Policy is unconstitutional both because it concerns a "religious matter,"
and because many people disagree with or about it. This argument reworks the
previous one and seeks to cure its absurdity by limiting the applicability of the
proposed connection between discord and invalidity to "religious matters." In
other words, it is not disagreement, division, partisanship, or faction-generation
against which the First Amendment protects; rather, it is division, partisanship,
or faction-generation concerning "religious matters" that either indicates or
constitutes a constitutional violation.
There are, however, (at least) four problems with this retooled objection.
First, the attempt to narrow the applicability, or shorten the reach, of the
antidivisiveness principle to "religious matters" depends on the possibility of
identifying such matters and distinguishing them meaningfully from other
"matters" about which people deeply disagree.282 It is not enough to respond
here that "religious matters" include matters of religious liturgy, ritual, member-
ship, and creed. After all, no "political division along religious lines" doctrine is
necessary to prohibit government from legislating with respect to such things.
Several far less controversial First Amendment rules-the "secular purpose"
requirement, for example 2 8 3 or the "no religious decisions" principle284-and
fairly well-entrenched commitments to church autonomy would preclude almost
281. WALDRON, supra note 278, at 1.
282. See generally Steven D. Smith, The "Secular, " the "Religious, " and the "Moral": What Are
We Talking About?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487 (2001) [hereinafter Smith, Secular] (examining and
challenging "the categories and distinctions that pervade the modem discourse of religious freedom-
distinctions between the "religious" and the "secular" and between "religion" and "morality"); Steven
D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEx. L.
REV. 955, 1009-10 (1989); Christine L. Niles, Note, Epistemological Nonsense? The Secular/Religious
Distinction, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 561, 562 (2003) (contending that "no coherent
line separates the 'secular' from the 'religious"').
283. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 39; see also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONvICTIONS AND
POLmcAL CHOICE 90-91 (1988) ("A liberal society ... has no business dictating matters of religious
belief and worship to its citizens."). Professor Lupu has explained how the secular-purpose requirement
helps us to avoid "the political hazards of sectarian religious conflict." Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction
and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CoNraMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 368
(1996).
284. See, e.g., TIIBE, supra note 265, at 1226, 1231; EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 826-40 (2001).
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any imaginable Policy addressing such matters.2 85 What, then, would the objec-
tor have in mind in declaring unconstitutional controversial state action touch-
ing on "religious matters"? Most religions, after all, purport to speak to the
complete human experience. Religion might be a "private matter,, 28 6 but it
certainly purports to speak to more than the interior life. For many religious
people, much or even all that they do-whether or not it is done in the context
of prayer, liturgy, or ritual-is "religious. 287
A second objection to this revised, narrowed argument is that it depends on
another, unarticulated claim, namely, a descriptive or predictive claim that
disagreements about some matters are not only more searing, difficult, or
regrettable than others, but also that disagreements about some matters, but not
others, render unconstitutional legislation touching on those matters. Certainly,
this premise is asserted explicitly, if not defended in any detail, both in Chief
Justice Burger's Lemon opinion and in the Freund comment on which the Chief
Justice relied. But what is it, exactly, about disagreements concerning "reli-
gious" matters-as opposed to others-that creates this effect? As Justice
Brennan once put it, "[tihat public debate of religious ideas, like any other, may
arouse emotion, may incite, may foment religious divisiveness and strife does
not rob it of constitutional protection. 288 If the mere fact of disagreement about
the Policy cannot seriously be regarded as enough to invalidate it, what is it
about the proposed sub-set of disagreements-i.e., disagreements about "reli-
gious matters"-that make them more objectionable or, more precisely, unconsti-
tutional?
It should not be enough simply to assert that our "traditions" authorize, let
alone compel, such a conclusion.2 89 As was noted above, warnings about
division, and calls for unity, are nothing new. However, that those who drafted
and ratified the Constitution knew about, and hoped to avoid repeating, the
history of religion-related strife, division, persecution, and violence does not
mean that it is a "basic purpose" of the Establishment Clause to "avoid that
divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict"2 0 or, more
specifically, that such a "purpose" provides its enforceable, substantive con-
285. But see, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 77 (Cal.
2004) (upholding California's law requiring all employers within the state to provide contraceptive
coverage to their employees in the face of the argument that an organization describing itself as "an
organ of the Roman Catholic Church" should be exempt from a law requiring conduct violative of
Catholic moral teaching).
286. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 ("[T]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a
private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice .... ).
287. See, e.g., Smith, Secular, supra note 282, at 500 (discussing, among other things, the "ontotheo-
logical synthesis").
288. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
289. But see, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623 ("It conflicts with our whole history and tradition to
permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our
elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues and problems that confront every level
of government.").
290. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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tent.291 As Professor Smith has explained, the founding generation's fears,
hopes, and expectations regarding the First Amendment's social effects-that is,
regarding the political and other consequences of adopting and enforcing it-
should be distinguished from the Amendment's meaning.292 (In fact, he insists,
the better reading of the Establishment Clause is one that makes no claims about
"principles" of religious freedom or social life at all.293 ) The point is, observa-
tions about the extent to which we have regarded and reasonably regard
"religious" disagreements as particularly searing, or "religion" as something
that is particularly likely to be divisive, do not-standing alone-justify the
conclusion that the First Amendment authorizes judges to invalidate laws
touching on or relating to "religion." The claim here is not that "religion" is not
different or that religion's difference does not matter;294 it is that the asserted
salience or intensity of political divisiveness along religious lines does not
authorize the invalidation on Establishment Clause grounds of assertedly divi-
sive state actions.
Third, it is not clear what additional work the existence of disagreement or
division really does. Is the new claim that (a) disagreement and division are
unavoidable, and therefore constitutionally permissible; (b) state action or
policy touching on religious matters is, or can be, constitutionally permissible;
but (c) state actions or policies (i) touching on religious matters and (ii) about
which people disagree strongly are not constitutionally permissible? One would
think that if religious matters and state actions touching on or directed toward
them are identifiable by reviewing judges, then the better rule might be simply
to invalidate such actions, period, without inquiring further into the existence
vel non of "division," given that, as was noted above, division standing alone
does not establish or even suggest unconstitutionality. But, of course, it is not
the case that laws relating to or touching upon "religious matters" are, for that
291. Professor Perry put the matter well: "If Policy X 'establishes' religion, Policy X is probably
divisive along religious lines. But that Policy Y is divisive along religious lines does not entail that
Policy Y 'establishes' religion." E-mail from Michael Perry, Associate Dean and Professor of Law,
Emory Law School, to Richard Garnett, Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 27,
2005) (on file with author).
292. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[The Establishment Clause's]
prohibitions naturally tend, as they were designed to, to avoid channeling political activity along
religious lines and to reduce any tendency toward religious divisiveness in society. Beyond enforcing
these prohibitions, however, government may not go. The antidote which the Constitution provides
against zealots who would inject sectarianism into the political process is to subject their ideas to
refutation in the marketplace of ideas, and their platforms to rejection at the polls.").
293. See, e.g., STEVEN D. Sarm, FoREORDAuum FARuRE: TmE QUEST FOR A CONsrrmrrtONAL PpNC'ILE
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995); Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reap-
praisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2006).
294. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAuL L. REV. 1, 3
(2000) ("[It is virtually impossible to understand our tradition of the separation of church and state
without recognizing that religion raises political and constitutional issues not raised by other institutions
or ideologies.").
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reason, unconstitutional.295
Fourth, there remains the quantification problem with this and any other
version of the Argument. Even assuming that we have shortened the Argument's
leash, so that it is not disagreement, discord, and strife that indicate or cause
unconstitutionality, but only disagreement about certain things; and assuming
also that these things-that is, "religious" matters-can meaningfully be segre-
gated from the run of issues about which people in a free society disagree; how
much disagreement will invalidate a measure touching upon such matters?
296
Relatedly, whose disagreement or objections will count?2 97 "Reasonable" people
only? Nonreligious people particularly? Members of religious minorities espe-
cially? 298 Is "divisiveness" constitutionally unobjectionable, so long as it taints
relations and conversations only between unreasonable people? Surely, the fact
that there is a plaintiff-that is, that someone has created "division" by filing a
lawsuit-does not even indicate, let alone establish, "divisiveness" of the kind
that might raise concerns of a constitutional dimension? True, words like
"strife" and "divisiveness," fairly understood, carry a connotation of substantial
conflict, not just trivial disagreements. Nevertheless, this and any other version
of the Argument that purports either to deduce or infer unconstitutionality from
"political divisiveness along religious lines" appear vulnerable to a "how much?"
objection.
The Policy is unconstitutional because it concerns a "religious matter" and
people tend to disagree, or have historically disagreed, or are assumed to
disagree about such matters. "Religious matters," in other words, are inherently
divisive. 299 This version of the Argument seems to avoid the "who counts?" and
295. It is widely accepted, for instance, that governments may accommodate, without unconstitution-
ally establishing, religion. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2121 (2005) (rejecting
Establishment Clause challenge to Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act provisions
accommodating religious exercise in prison). See generally McConnell, supra note 294, at 3 ("My
thesis is that 'singling out religion' for special constitutional protection is fully consistent with our
constitutional tradition.").
296. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REv.
713, 716 (2001) (proposing an empirical method for determining whether the government has violated
the Establishment Clause by endorsing religion).
297. Compare Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 765-69 (1995)
(insisting that "erroneous conclusions of state endorsement... do not count" against the constitutional-
ity of permitting private religious expression in an open forum), with id. at 778-82 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that a "reasonable observer" should be aware of the history and context of a public
park where diverse groups engage in expressive conduct, and therefore should not perceive the display
of a cross by a private speaker as government "endorsement" of religion), and id. at 807-12 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that a "reasonable observer" should not be presumed to have detailed knowl-
edge of the history of the relevant forum, and that the "endorsement test" should take more seriously
the perspective of dissenters and outsiders).
298. Cf FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 238-44 (arguing that one "way toward greater national unity in
the face of our religious diversity" is for "legal secularists" to appreciate that "so long as all citizens
have the same right to [speak as individuals or as groups], no one group or person should be threatened
or excluded by the symbolic or political speech of others, much as they may disagree").
299. Cf Marty, supra note 87, at 655 ("[Rleligion, when vital, is never easily contained within a
defined and disciplined sphere. Religion is never self-contained, never unconnected. It always stands
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"how much?" challenges. It is also close both to the heart of Chief Justice
Burger's complaint in Lemon and to Justice Breyer's concerns in Zelman. Both
of these Justices, remember, linked the argument from division to certain
assertions and presumptions about the history of our debates about public
education and parochial schools. For this version to work, all that needs to be
established is that the policy in question concerns such a matter.3 00 This version
also responds, in a way, to the second and third objections to the previous
version of the Argument. Like the previous version, this one invites the question
whether and how "religious matters" can be identified. Still, it purports to avoid
difficult empirical or sociological inquiries into the existence or intensity of
contemporary disagreements about the specific Policy at issue. This is because
once it has been determined that the Policy concerns a "religious matter,"
political divisiveness is presumed and the Policy is invalid. This version col-
lapses, then, into the claim that "any law concerning a 'religious matter'-
because such matters cause divisiveness-violates the Establishment Clause."
But again, this claim cannot possibly be right, given that laws accommodating
religion are permissible.3 °1 In any event, any workable content this version of
the argument has is provided by other, more plausible, First Amendment
doctrines, including Lemon's "secular purpose" requirement. 30 2 What's more, it
is not clear that religion has been a "distinctively divisive force in our soci-
ety."'30 3 After all, as Judge McConnell has urged, "[rieligious differences.., have
never generated the civil discord experienced in political conflicts over such
issues as the Vietnam War, racial segregation, the Red Scare, unionization, or
slavery.' '30
4
Another variation on the Argument might turn from the nature of the issues or
conduct addressed by the Policy to the nature of the arguments and motivations
supporting and behind it. In other words, instead of examining the Policy's
content, the objector would highlight its purpose. Instead of asking "Does this
Policy concern a 'religious matter'?", a challenger would ask, "Why, or for
the potential of being 'widened."'). But see, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 341 F.3d 312, 322 (4th Cir. 2003)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Religious expression can be divisive, but
it need not be so. The disparate strands of belief can come together in a broader unity much as streams
unite into a river.").
300. Cf. FELoMAN, supra note 9, at 245 (asserting that school vouchers "create[] conflict and
division"); Freund, supra note 97, at 1692 ("Although great issues of constitutional law are never
settled until they are settled right, still as between open-ended, ongoing political warfare and such
binding quality as judicial decisions possess, I would choose the latter in the field of God and Caesar
and the public treasury.").
301. See supra note 295.
302. Chief Justice Rehnquist's own trimmed-down version of the Argument-in which its applicabil-
ity is confined strictly to cases concerning public funds and parochial schools-is not unlike this
version. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 308, 404 n.ll (1983) (stating that the question of "political
divisiveness" should be "regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to
parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools").
303. Smith, supra note 267, at 208 (emphasis added).
304. Michael W. McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 BYU L. REV. 405, 413.
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what reasons, was the Policy proposed or enacted?" This version, then, would
go something like this: The Policy is unconstitutional because many people
support it for "religious" reasons.3 °5 The Policy has been rendered unconstitu-
tional not so much because of its subject matter, but because its supporters have
been insufficiently attentive to their purported obligation to invoke in support of
government action only "accessible" arguments sounding in "public reason.',
30 6
This claim is not very different from Lemon's secular-purpose require-
ment.3 °7 Remember, though, that the Court's most prominent deployment of the
secular-purpose requirement, in Edwards v. Aguillard,3 °8 was animated pre-
cisely by a desire to exclude "divisive forces" from the public schools and by
the view that the public school "is at once the symbol of our democracy and the
most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny., 30 9 On the other
hand, the focus of courts' inquiry under the secular-purpose requirement seems
less on public reaction to or effects of a proposal than on the "purpose that
animated [its] adoption. 310 What is not clear in the cases, though, is whether
the absence of a secular purpose invalidates a law because laws lacking such a
purpose are, constitutionally speaking, ultra vires; because such laws are,
precisely in that they lack a secular purpose, outside the competence of secular
actors to enact; or because such laws are thought likely to have undesirable
social effects, including causing "divisiveness."
In his important treatment of the secular-purpose requirement, Professor
Koppelman points toward this last rationale, defending the requirement's neces-
sity in part on the ground that the "doctrine cannot be discarded.., without
effectively reading the Establishment Clause out of the Constitution altogether.
The result would be heightened civil strife, corruption of religion, and oppres-
sion of religious minorities., 31  That said, the core, for Koppelman, of the
305. Of course, one might just as well add, to this formulation, "or oppose it."
306. See generally JoHN RAwLS, POLrrICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1993) (defending an ethos of "public
reason" that requires, inter alia, that arguments about public policy be couched in terms that are
"accessible" to all citizens and that do not presuppose adherence to any religion or other "comprehen-
sive" philosophy); William Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HAsm-nos L.J. 843, 844 (1993)
(contending that "religion and religious conviction are purely private matters that have no role or place"
in the political arena).
307. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). More recently, of course, the Court
invalidated the Ten Commandments display at issue in McCreary County on the ground that it lacked a
"secular purpose." See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2735-36 (2005). And, Justice
Souter explicitly linked the secular-purpose inquiry with judicial concerns about, and perhaps a
constitutional duty to avoid, religious divisiveness. See id. at 2742-43.
308. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
309. Id. at 584 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion
of Frankfurter, J.)); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 131 (2001) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Such recruiting meetings may introduce divisiveness and tend to separate young
children into cliques that undermine the school's educational mission.").
310. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585; see also id. ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.") (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
311. Koppelman, supra note 39, at 88.
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secular-purpose requirement is not its instrumental value in achieving civic
peace or political unity, but is rather the fundamental "principle" that "govern-
ment may not declare religious truth. ' 31 2 He takes care to emphasize that the
secular-purpose requirement, properly understood, "focuses on what govern-
ment is saying rather than on who supported any particular law.",31 3 As ex-
pounded by Koppelman, it turns out that the secular-purpose requirement
reflects not so much constitutional squeamishness about political divisiveness as
it does a worry that, without it, government would be too powerful-its sphere
of imagined competence too vast-and that a government so empowered or
deluded would pose serious threats to the freedom of conscience.314 An increase
in division and strife might be a foreseeable consequence of jettisoning the
secular-purpose requirement, but it does not appear that the secular-purpose
requirement is, for Koppelman, merely a translation of Justice Burger's equa-
tion in Lemon of divisiveness and entanglement.
Returning, then, to the current version of the Argument-that is, "The Policy
is unconstitutional because many people support it for 'religious' reasons": It is
convincing only to the extent we believe that the Constitution in fact incorpo-
rates Rawlsian or similar restrictions on political argument and action. But even
if one embraces Koppelman's defense of the secular-purpose requirement, one
need not accept the suggested incorporation into the First Amendment of
"public reason" rules for political activity and argument.31 5 The case has not
been made, in other words, that the Constitution's ban on "law[s] respecting an
establishment of religion ' 316 prohibits the use of religiously grounded argu-
ments in public life or about public matters, or requires the invalidation of
policies that were supported, by some, using such arguments.317
312. Id. at 89. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see, for example, Richard W. Garnett,
Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L.
REv. 1645 (2004). See also Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 ChI.-KENT L. REv. 625 (2003).
313. See Koppelman, supra note 39, at 93.
314. Id. at 166 ("[T]he case for the secular purpose requirement goes beyond the purposes of the
Establishment Clause. Religious justification is a powerful thing. If there were no restraints on the
ability of the state to rely on such justifications, then the state could invoke such justifications whenever
it wanted to override any constitutional constraint. Such justifications are by their nature so powerful as
to override any countervailing constraint, for what could be more important than carrying out the will
of God?").
315. See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious
Arguments Should be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. Rev. 639, 644-48
(arguing that the "principle of secular rationale" is "inconsistent with the American constitutional
tradition").
316. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
317. See generally PERRY, supra note 70, at 20-34. For a small, but still representative, sampling of
the legal and political-theory literature on this issue, see, for example, GREENAWALT, supra note 283;
RELIGION AND CoNTEMPoRARY LIBERAusM (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997); ROBERT AuDi & NICHOLAS
WOLTERsTOR", RELIGION IN THE PUBLIc SQUARE (1997); Symposium, Religion in the Public Square, 42
WM. & MARY L. REv. 647 (2001); Symposium, Religiously Based Morality: Its Proper Place in
American Law and Public Policy?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 217 (2001); Symposium, The Role of
Religion in Public Debate in Liberal Society, SAN DIEo L. REv. 643 (1993).
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Next, a slight variation on the version of the Argument just considered: The
Policy is unconstitutional because many people disagree with, or about it, and
many of those who support or oppose it have advanced religious arguments for
doing so. This version reincorporates what was missing in the previous one,
namely, the fact of political disagreement or division relating to the Policy.
Remember, that a policy fails Lemon's secular-purpose requirement does not
mean that it is divisive. In fact, it is easy to imagine, in many jurisdictions,
proposals that, under Edwards, lack a "secular purpose" but that are not, in any
meaningful or worrisome sense, politically divisive. This version of the Argu-
ment combines the fact of observed or predicted social division with claims
about the reasons underlying the contending factions' positions. Political disagree-
ment alone could hardly be treated as evidence, let alone conclusive evidence,
of unconstitutionality. However, political disagreement that proceeds from or
rests upon religious disagreements, it is claimed, is more threatening to democ-
racy and is therefore constitutionally suspect in light of the First Amendment.318
In light of what has already been said, though, this variation is no more
convincing than the others. If disagreement, standing alone, does not raise
constitutional red flags, and if we do not accept as a foundational premise the
constraint that political argument and action must comply with (certain versions
of) "public reason" requirements, then it is not clear, as a matter of political
morality or as a matter of constitutional law, why the combination of two
innocuous features of the public debate about a particular Policy should point
toward its invalidity.319 Certainly, if one elects to proceed from "public reason"
premises-if one decides, ex ante, that we are or will be deemed to be acting
within a constitutionally established "secular public moral order" 3 2 -then this
version of the argument might seem plausible, even appealing. Nonetheless, it is
worth highlighting the fact that the workability and attractiveness of this and
other versions of the Argument depend crucially on what are in fact contestable
and controversial claims about political morality, activity, relations, and argu-
ments.
Accordingly, we might adjust the Argument even further: The Policy is
unconstitutional because many people disagree with or about it, and the "lines'"
318. As the discussion in Part II illustrated, Justice Powell's use of the argument from division
appears tightly connected to his concerns for the stability of the political process, and his belief that
arguments cast in religious language, or concerning certain matters, posed special risks to that process.
319. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115,
130 (1992) ("[T]he political victories of either side in [political] controversies could be divisive; but the
doctrine did not-and could not-work both ways. In effect, the doctrine blamed the religious side of
any controversy for the controversy.").
320. Sullivan, supra note 39, at 198; cf CASS SUNsTEiN, THE PARTLAL CONSTrrutoN 307 (1999)
(contending that the Constitution set up "a secular, liberal democracy in a way that is intended to
minimize religious tension"); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious
Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 Cmi.-KErN L. REv. 417, 426 (2000) ("[T]he
Constitution was designed to undermine the political influence of narrow and insular forms of
zealotry.").
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* of disagreement appear to "track" religious "divisions." This version does not
address the purpose or subject matter of the Policy; nor, unlike the previous one,
does it address the motives or supporting arguments of the Policy's fans and
detractors. Rather, it purports to reduce the Argument's predicates entirely to
sociological data: The claim is that the lines separating the Policy's supporters
and opponents overlap or resemble other existing lines-namely, religious or
denominational lines-in the polity, and that the Policy is therefore constitution-
ally suspect. Again, however, what is doing the work in this claim is not-and
cannot reasonably be-the mere fact of disagreement. Rather, the point is that
the political and cultural fault lines created or exposed by the Policy coincide
with pre-existing divisions, namely, religious divisions. Under this version, the
objector need not establish, or even offer, an explanation for this coincidence;
perhaps it is not because of religion, and has nothing to do with doctrine or
discipline.
Because two innocuous facts, when combined, are no more troubling than
one, the claim must be that lines of disagreement that track or reveal religious
differences are, for that reason, worse than those that track or reveal other
cultural, social, and political differences (for example, race, gender, age, ethnic-
ity, class, etc.). But we need not accept this claim. At the very least, one
advancing it should be required to explain why-as a matter of constitutional
law, and not simply societal aesthetics-public reactions to a Policy that follow,
say, racial or gender fault lines do not, for that reason, tend to invalidate the
policy, while reactions that track purported religious divisions do. "Division" in
society and in politics might well be unattractive and troubling. However, it
remains to explain why it would be that the religious divisions, if any, that
manifest themselves in response to state actions or legislative proposals should
be relevant to the validity of such actions.
If this last version of the Argument turned away from the motives or
supporting arguments of the Policy's supporters and detractors, yet another
version might return the focus to the motives or purposes of government
officials: The Policy is unconstitutional because the government has acted in
order to, or with the intent to, "divide" the polity along religious lines. This
version of the Argument seems plausible at first, if only because most of us
would regard state action designed merely to "divide"-let alone to divide
along religious lines-as unseemly and unworthy. At first blush, it seems
unlikely that any American government or state actor would ever act with this
purpose-or, at least, solely with this purpose. Is it sensible or worthwhile, then,
to construct Establishment Clause doctrine around a predicted or feared phenom-
enon that is so strange, and therefore so unlikely? To be sure, governments do
act, and can hardly avoid acting, with the knowledge-perhaps with the sure
knowledge-that the people will be divided in response. Such division is,
government actors can reasonably conclude, inevitable.
In fact, however, the challenger might insist, government officials and legisla-
tors do act with the purpose of dividing the public. What in the world of
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political pundits are known as "hot button" or "wedge" issues are matters
concerning which legislators act, not only with the awareness that their actions
will be controversial, but with the desire to create controversy, to sharpen
disagreements, to stir up engagement and activism, and so on. Issues are often
brought to a head, and put to a vote, primarily to require one's political
opponents to make a public decision that will, it is hoped, be offensive or
infuriating to certain people. Symbolic votes on symbolic policies are regularly
engineered, then, precisely to divide. But precisely because these votes and
policies are an unremarkable staple of political life in our democracy, it is hard
to accept an argument whose conclusion is that they are unconstitutional.
Perhaps, though, the objection to such legislative moves is more focused.
That is, even if intentionally divisive state actions on "hot button" matters are
unavoidable and, in a free society, unobjectionable, state actions that are
intended to cause or exploit divisions along religious lines are particularly
offensive. Such a motive by legislators or officials is so base, it is argued, that a
policy animated by it should be invalid. Divisions over policies--even divisions
along religious lines-might well be unavoidable, but these latter divisions in
particular should not and may not be exploited. 321 Like the previous version,
though, this argument collapses in the end into a claim that religious divisions
are just worse, and that their worse-ness is constitutionally relevant. If a
legislative motive to exploit cultural or other divisions for political purposes
does not (and cannot) invalidate a policy animated by such a motive, then it
remains to be explained why, exactly, the conclusion should be any different
when the divisions in question track religious lines.
Finally, there is perhaps the most modest version of the Argument, in which it
is not maintained that the existence of "political divisiveness along religious
lines" concerning a Policy, or an official desire to create or exploit such
divisiveness, is by itself what invalidates a policy. Rather, the now-chastened
objector's claim is that the existence of "political division along religious lines"
concerning the Policy serves as a "warning signal" that the Policy could be
unconstitutional, and triggers careful scrutiny, using other doctrinal tools, the
application of which determines the Policy's validity.322 Importantly, the exis-
tence or prediction of such division does not itself serve as such a doctrinal tool.
321. Just as earlier versions of the Argument ran up against the problem of distinguishing between
"religious" and other subject matters, this version invites the question, "What are 'religious lines' ?" Are
the "lines" that we do not want our political splits to overlay the lines between the irreligious and the
religious? Among Christian denominations? Between the orthodox and the latitudinarian? And so on.
322. See TRIBE, supra note 265, at 1282 (stating that division should serve as a "warning signal[],
suggesting stricter judicial scrutiny but not serving to condemn what government has done"); see also
Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973) ("[W]hile the
prospect of such divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws that otherwise
survive the careful scrutiny required by the decisions of this Court, it is certainly a 'warning signal' not
to be ignored." (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzmann, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971))). Professors Larry Solum and
Larry Alexander made a similar point when I presented this Article at the University of San Diego Law
School's faculty workshop.
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To the extent that Chief Justice Burger suggested otherwise in Lemon,32 3 he was
simply mistaken, or carried away. In fact, this version goes, when one considers
carefully what the Court actually did in Lemon, and in the many other cases-
reviewed in Part Two-where "political divisiveness along religious lines" is
invoked in the context of Establishment Clause review, one sees that division
often serves as a "signal," not as a standard. Difficult questions remain, cer-
tainly, about what doctrinal tools should be employed, and how, after such a
signal; nevertheless, "political divisiveness along religious lines" remains rel-
evant to, but not outcome-determinative of, the question of a Policy's constitu-
tional validity.
At first, this version of the Argument seems reasonable and restrained. It also
appears to capture accurately what most courts are actually doing with their
observations about and predictions of "political divisiveness along religious
lines." That is, this version is consonant with the observation above that the
political-divisiveness argument seems to have served primarily as a rhetorical
device or as a concluding flourish to the application of other doctrinal "tests."
Still, we should ask, what is it about "political divisiveness along religious
lines" that should trigger the application of tools that would, presumably, not be
applied in its absence? What does an observation or prediction about the
presence or threat of "division" add to the set of facts presented in a complaint
alleging a violation of the Establishment Clause? Do such observations and
predictions trigger the deployment by judges of different First Amendment tests
and tools? Are there two layers of scrutiny: Establishment Clause analysis in the
absence of division, and such analysis in its presence or under its shadow? Or, is
it that the usual tests and tools are applied in cases involving such observations
and predictions with greater zeal or precision? A constitutional rule applied with
"greater zeal or precision" in a certain kind of case is, however, a different rule
from the one applied on another kind of case. Even this final reformulation of
the Argument requires its defenders to explain what is meant by a "warning
signal" and whether the sending or perceiving of the signal works any change in
the doctrine or standard being applied.
In addition, this "warning signal" variation calls for an explanation of why
the presence of division or divisiveness should serve as a "warning signal" of
anything at all, let alone that something is constitutionally amiss. That a Policy
is prompting "political divisiveness along religious lines" certainly tells us
something about the Policy and also about religion. It is not clear, though, that it
tells us anything about .the Policy's merits, let alone its constitutional validity.
Stated simply, while "political divisiveness along religious lines" might well be
undesirable and unattractive, and might well "signal" problems in the political
life of a community, and might well attend violations of the Establishment
323. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624-25. Chief Justice Burger contended that entanglement between
government and religion is both an "independent evil against which the Religion Clauses were intended
to protect" and a "warning signal" that further evils are menacing.
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Clause, it nonetheless should play no role in the evaluation by judges of First
Amendment challenges to state action. What it "signals"---disagreement, plural-
ism, and the exercise of religious freedom-are, in the end, constitutionally
protected facts of life.
CONCLUSION
Few epithets in contemporary discourse are as wounding, yet tedious and
vacuous, as the charge that a person, claim, argument, proposal, or belief is
"divisive." The term-like "controversial," "extremist," and "partisan"-often
does little more than signal the speaker's disapproval, and his desire that the
offending target either be quiet or change his tune.324 The point of this Article
has been to investigate, in a more precise way, the claim being made about the
relation between what is asserted or assumed to be a real-world fact-that is,
"political fragmentation on sectarian lines" 325-and the constitutionality of
challenged state action.
James Madison acknowledged, in The Federalist No. 10, that "[t]he instabil-
ity, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth,
been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere
perished," and he conceded that the "violence of faction" was such govern-
ments' "dangerous vice. 32 6 The solution, though, was not and could not be the
suppression or elimination of disagreement and faction. He explained:
The diversity in the faculties of men ... is... an insuperable obstacle to a
uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of
government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquir-
ing property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immedi-
ately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of
the respective proprietors ensures a division of the society into different
interests and parties.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see
them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society.
3 2 7
324. Justice Scalia made a similar point, regarding the term "corruption," dissenting in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 684 (1990) ("[V]irtually anything the Court deems
politically undesirable can be turned into political corruption-by simply describing its effects as
politically 'corrosive,' which is close enough to 'corruptive' to qualify."). See also Christopher
Hitchens, Bring on the Mud, WILSON Q., Autumn 2004, at 44, 44 ("What's the most reprehensible thing
a politician can be these days? Why, partisan, of course. What's the most disapproving thing that can be
said of a 'partisan' remark? That it's divisive.").
325. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664,695 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
326. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
327. Id.; see also Sullivan, supra note 20, at 6 ("The U.S. Constitution was devised not as a means
to avoid social and cultural polarization, but as a way to manage it without splitting the country
apart.").
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The widely discussed and regretted divisions that run through our politics and
communities make appealing to many a more managerial approach to politics
and public life. But division and disagreement about important things is, this
side of Heaven, a fact.32 8 In any event, Madison's warning remains as powerful
as ever: "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it
instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is
essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish
the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire
its destructive agency."32 9
328. See AMY GurmANN & DENNIs THOMPSON, DEMocRAcY AND DISAGREEMENT 360 (1996) (noting
that "[m]any theorists of democracy refuse to face up to [the] moral fact of political life" that, "given
the intractable sources of disagreement, citizens cannot expect to reach mutually justifiable agreement
over the whole range of significant issues in politics").
329. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 n.8 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Madison suggested in the
Fifty-first Federalist that the religious diversity which existed at the time of the Constitutional
Convention constituted a source of strength for religious freedom, much as the multiplicity of economic
and political interests enhanced the security of other civil rights.").
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